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RIGHTS OF DRAWERS, BANKS, AND HOLDERS
IN BANK CHECKS AND OTHER CASH
EQUIVALENTS
Leona Beane*
Sellers often consider personal checks unreliable and seek
more secure forms ofpayment. Professor Beane analyzes vari-
ous forms of cash substitutes, and discusses the legal ramifica-
tions of each, including ability to stop payment and recourse
against banks. Professor Beane also makes suggestions for
amendments to the Un/form Commercial Code.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the commercial world, checks' are used by buyers as a form of
payment. When a buyer pays with a personal check the right to stop
payment of the instrument and issue a stop payment order to the bank
* Associate Professor, Law Department, Bernard M. Baruch College, City University of
New York. B.B.A. 1958, M.B.A. 1962, City College of New York; M.S. 1964, Columbia Univer-
sity; J.D. 1968, New York Law School.
1. A check is a draft drawn on a bank, payable on demand. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) (1978).
The depositor is the drawer and the bank is the drawee. Until a bank accepts a check, it is not
liable on the instrument. Id at § 3-401(1). Acceptance is the drawee's "signed engagement to
honor the draft as presented." Id at § 3-410(1). Certification of a check is acceptance by the
drawee, bank. Id at § 3-411(1). Once the bank certifies the check, the bank becomees primarily
liable.
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is provided for by statute.2 As a general rule, a bank customer has the
right and the power to issue a stop payment order to the bank any time
prior to payment or acceptance. 3 The ability to stop payment is a serv-
ice which depositors expect and are entitled to receive from banks. 4 If
a bank failed to honor a stop payment order, the bank would have
failed to follow its depositor's instructions, and would be responsible
for damages sustained by the customer.'
Frequently, sellers are unwilling to accept payment by personal
check because of the risk of insufficient funds or a stop payment order.
If a stop payment order is used, the seller may have to instigate sub-
stantial litigation in order to collect its money. This is particularly true
in transactions involving large sums of money, such as the purchase of
2. U.C.C. § 4-403(1) (1978) provides:
A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for his account
but the order must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a
reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to the
item ....
3. See id § 4-303, § 4-403 and the Official Comments (customer's right to stop payment;
items subject to stop order). For discussion of customer's rights relating to stop payment orders,
see generally PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, U.C.C. SURVEY 77-91 (1981).
4. U.C.C. § 4-403 comment 2 (1978) provides that "stopping payment is a service which
depositors expect and are entitled to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconven-
ience and expense."
For a discussion of a customer's right to issue stop payment orders and the problems in-
volved, see Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 3 U.C.C. L.J.
103 (1970); Holahan, Stop Orders, I RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 31 (1960); Murray, The Stop Payment of
ChecksAnd The Holder In Due Course, 84 BANKING L.J. (1967); Note, The Stop Payment Order-
A Potential Pandora's Box For the Drawer, 39 ALB. L. REv. 252 (1975); Note, Stopping Payment of
Checks, 79 BANKING L.J. 185 (1962); Comment, Stop Payment Orders Under the Unform Com-
mercial Code, 38 IND. L.J. 693 (1963); Note, Stop Payment and the Unform Commercial Code, 28
IND. L.J. 95 (1952) (pre-Code article; includes a discussion of proposed U.C.C.); Note, Adverse
Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 915 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926) (pre-Code,
holding bank responsible, creating absolute liability of bank); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Battat, 297
N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948) (common law liability of bank is to follow customer's instructions
as absolute in absence of ratification by depositor or contract limiting liability); American Defense
Soc'y v. Sherman Nat'l Bank, 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919) (rule prior to adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code).
Pursuant to U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1978), the burden of establishing the loss is on the customer.
Cicci v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 46 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Syracuse City Ct.
1965). In such an action, the bank, according to U.C.C. § 4-407 (1978), is subrogated to the rights
of the payee or any other holder against the drawer, the rights of the drawer against the payee or
any other holder, and of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer, so as to prevent
unjust enrichment.
For rules concerning the burden of proof by plaintiff and the bank's burden of going forward,
see Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co., 34 N.Y.2d 404, 358 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1974), modfled on other
grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 994, 360 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1974); Saratoga Polo Assoc. v. Adirondack Trust Co.,
118 Misc. 2d 247,460 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1983); Thomas v. Marine Midland
Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976).
As to the subrogation rights of the bank, see Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. AVA Indus-
tries, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 614, 414 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1978).
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a business, a piece of real estate, or a car. A dissatisfied buyer can
block or delay payment on a personal check by issuing a stop payment
order to the bank. The buyer thus strengthens his bargaining position
by forcing the seller to proceed with court action or satisfy the buyer's
complaints. An unscrupulous buyer may use such procedures to post-
pone payment till a much later date after prolonged litigation. Such
tactics may also force the seller to settle the dispute early and give the
buyer a substantial discount so as to avoid a lengthy court battle.
To combat such abuses, many sellers insist on payment in the form
of a "bank check" such as a certified check, cashier's check, teller's
check, or bank money order. These various bank checks are thought of
as cash substitutes, that is, the equivalent of cash. The use of such
checks avoids the risk of insufficient funds, since a bank is holding the
money and it is unlikely that a bank will become insolvent, particularly
since the federal government insures such deposits. Recently, however,
sellers have increasingly found themselves involved in litigation con-
cerning bank checks. As a result, sellers are starting to question
whether these bank checks are really cash equivalents.
This article will show that there are significant differences between
these various types of bank checks, especially in the obligations of the
parties and the ability of bank customers to direct the bank to stop
payment of these instruments.6
II. CERTIFIED CHECKS
A certified check is a personal check of the depositor, drawn on the
depositor's own account, and subsequently signed by an authorized
bank officer. By signing the check, the drawee bank accepts the draft,
and becomes primarily liable on the instrument to the payee and any
subsequent holder.8 At the time of certification, the bank charges the
check as an item and withdraws the funds from the control of the
6. The right to direct a bank to stop payment is not limited to a drawer of a check, "but may
be issued by any customer who wishes to countermand the payment of any item to be charged
against his bank account." Hawkland, supra note 4, at 105.
7. U.C.C. §§ 3-410 to 411 (1978); H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS §§ 10.1, 10.7 (5th
ed. 1979).
8. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) (1978) provides that "[t]he maker or acceptor engages that he will pay
the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement .... " See Note, Blocking
Payment on a Cert4Yed, Cashier's or Bank Check, 73 MICH. L. REv. 424, 425 (1974) (bank, as
drawer and drawee, primarily liable to the payee for the check's stated amount). Certification is
more than an acceptance, "it is more than a promise by an acceptor to assume the payment of an
instrument." Note, The Liability of a Bank Upon the Cert#Fcation of a Check, 9 BROOKLYN L.
[Vol. 19:612
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drawer.9 By certifying a check a bank implies that it has sufficient
funds to cover the check, and the bank will be estopped from denying
that it lacks such funds.1" The check may be certified at the request of
a drawer, payee, or holder." Certification made at the request of a
drawer does not become effective until the check is issued and deliv-
ered to the payee.12
A depositor may not direct a bank to stop payment of an item after
it has been certified, but in some situations stopping payment after cer-
tification is allowed.' 3 For example, if the rights of third parties are not
involved, courts allow a depositor to issue a stop payment order to its
REv. 318, 319 (1940). A certified check circulates as the equivalent of that much cash in the bank,
payable on demand to the holder.
See also Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928), where the court held that
"certification of a check by the bank is equivalent to payment." Id. at 390, 164 N.E. at 327. In
First Nat'l Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 (1872), the Court held that certification of a check is a
contract which brings the holder of the check into privity with the drawee bank who has certified
it. Id at 345-46.
9. H. BAILEY, supra note 7, at § 7.1. The amount of the check is withdrawn from the
drawer's account and held by the bank as a deposit to the credit of the check.
There is no particular form essential in the certification of a check, except that it must be the
signed engagement of the bank to honor the check as presented. U.C.C. § 3-410(1) (1978). The
usual practice is to stamp or write on the check the word "certified" or "accepted" or an
equivalent expression, along with the signature of an officer of the bank.
10. See, e.g., Cooke v. State Nat'l Bank, 52 N.Y. 96 (1873) (bank estopped to deny sufficient
funds of drawer even though certification was fraudulent because bank had no funds of drawer).
See also Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 107 N.E. 69 (1915) (certification
equivalent to acceptance); Manhattan Co. v. Tunick, 134 Misc. 863, 237 N.Y.S. 230 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1929) (bank liable for certification made subsequent to stop payment order). It is a
federal crime to certify a check before the amount is regularly deposited, or to evade the law on
certification. 18 U.S.C. § 1004 (1982).
11. If the holder procures certification of the check, the drawer and all prior endorsers are
discharged. U.C.C. § 3-411(1) (1978). The drawer is not discharged if he obtains the certification.
Wallach, Negotiable Instruments: The Bank Customer's Ability to Prevent Payment on Various
Forms of Checks, 11 IND. L. REv. 579, 583 n.22 (1978); Comment, Uniform Commercial Code
Commentary: Commercial Paper: The Rights of a Remitter ofa Negotiable Instrument, 8 B.C. IND.
& Comm. L. REv. 260, 261 (1966).
12. See U.C.C. § 3-410(1) (1978) (acceptance operative when completed by delivery or
notification).
13. U.C.C. § 4-403(1)0 (1978). Comment 5 states:
There is no right to stop payment after certification of a check or other acceptance of a
draft, and this is true no matter who procures the certification. . . The acceptance is the
drawee's own engagement to pay, and he is not required to impair his credit by refusing
payment for the convenience of the drawer.
Id comment 5. A drawer may not stop payment on a check after certification, whether certifica-
tion was at the request of the holder, payee, or drawer. Maintenance Serv. Inc. v. Royal Nat'l
Bank, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 766 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1967). See also Hawk-
land, supra note 4, at 108 (commenting on U.C.C. § 4-403).
Between a bank and a drawer, certification has the same effect as payment, since the funds
representing the amount of the check are effectively withdrawn from the control of the drawer.
Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N.Y. 394, 404, 138 N.E. 33 (1923) (pre-Code). See 9 N.Y. JUR.
2d Banks § 373 at 611 (1982) (effect of certification; liability of certifying bank).
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bank, and authorize the bank to honor such a demand. t4 To accommo-
date its customer, a bank may issue a stop payment order on a certified
check, 5 but the bank will usually require indemnity from its cus-
tomer.' 6 If a bank refuses to honor a stop payment order of a certified
check, courts in some instances may enjoin the bank from making pay-
ment. 1 If the drawee bank honors the drawer's stop payment order, the
14. In Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345 N.Y.S.2d 263
(1972), af'd, 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (4th Dept. 1973), a certified check was given to an
escrow agent in connection with a real estate transaction. After the transaction fell through, the
agent still had the certified check which was to be returned if there was no closing. The court held
that the bank should honor the depositor's stop payment order of the certified check, as there was
a third party claim of ownership, and no change in position of the parties. The court stated "the
drawee bank may cancel its certification, particularly when there has been no change in the rights
or situation of the holder between the time of certification and the cancellation thereof so as to
render the revocation inequitable." 74 Misc. 2d at 410, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (citing Greenberg v.
World Exch. Bank, 227 A.D. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200 (1929)).
See generally, Lawrence, Making Cashier's Checks and other Bank Checks Cost Effective" A
Pleafor Revision ofArticles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 275, 320-
30 (1980) and Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1367 (1969), for two excellent discussions of certified checks
and questions regarding stop payment.
15. In Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc. 422 F. Supp. 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), the court held that a bank may cancel its certification if the holder is not a holder in due
course and has not changed his position in reliance on the bank's promise to pay, citing U.C.C.
§ 3-418. In that case, the payee received the check from the drawer in payment for goods which
were the subject of the dispute. Since the payee was a party to the contract, he was presumed to
have notice of any alleged defenses and could not be considered a holder in due course. The
additional issues of change of position in reliance and whether the bank could raise the personal
defenses of one not a holder in due course were left for trial. This decision was described as
erroneous in Lawrence, supra note 14, at 33 1.
16. See, e.g., Admiral Leather Corp., 422 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) where the court con-
cluded that the bank may cancel its certification unless the payee had changed its position in
reliance thereof. When the drawee bank decided to honor the stop payment it was agreed that the
bank would be indemnified. Id at 388.
17. Pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (1978), an adverse claimant may obtain an injunction
against the bank enjoining payment, or may supply indemnity to the bank. See Note, Adverse
Claims Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Survey and Proposal, 65 YALE L.J. 807, 812-16
(1956) (noting the strengths and weaknesses of U.C.C. § 3-603).
U.C.C. § 3-603(l) (1978) provides:
The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the
holder even though it is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instru-
ment unless prior to suchpayment or satisfaction theperson making the claim either supplies
indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or
satisfaction by order ofa court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the ad-
verse claimant and the holder are parties.
Id (emphasis added).
In Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), an action was
commenced to enjoin payment of two certified checks, one payable to the seller (Duntov), and one
payable to United Bank, a holder in due course. The drawer of the certified check was unable to
restrain the drawee bank from paying the certified check which had been certified at the request of
the payee (United Bank), which was a holder in due course and which had released its collateral.
However, the court permitted the drawer to enjoin paymentpendente lite of another certified check
payable to the seller of the stock, who was involved in a fraudulent transaction. Relying on
U.C.C. § 3-603 the court directed Duntov to return the check to Jefferies upon the posting of a
bond, which included indemnification of the drawee (Chase). The court found that when a payee
5
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bank will still be responsible to the payee and any subsequent holder of
the certified check since the drawee bank is primarily liable on a certi-
fied check.'" If a certified check is not in the hands of a holder in due
course or one who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on
the certification, a certifying bank may itself stop or resist payment. 19
As a general rule, the drawer may not order payment stopped on a
certified check since certification constitutes an acceptance. 20 This po-
sition is premised upon "the finality of payment rule," 2' which states
that a drawee bank may not cancel certification of a check if the holder
is a holder in due course, or a holder who has in good faith changed his
position in reliance upon the certification.2 2 If a bank wishes to comply
with its customer's directions to stop payment of a certified check, the
bank may pay the proceeds into court,23 implead the drawer, or
"vouch-in" the drawer if sued by the payee on its certification.24
has a check certified, the certification discharges the drawer on the instrument. Certification by a
holder discharges all prior parties on the instrument according to U.C.C. § 3-411(1). For a further
analysis of Jefferies, see Lawrence, supra note 14, at 330-32.
18. See, e.g., Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 197 N.E. 692 (1915) (after
certification the bank cannot resist payment in order to make a setoff available to its depositor).
19. See Rosenbaum v. First Nat'l City Bank, 13 A.D.2d 100, 213 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1961), aI'd,
II N.Y.2d 845, 227 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1962), where the court, in dicta stated that a bank may resist
payment if bank certifies or pays check through mistake as to sufficiency of a maker's account or
other similar circumstances.
20. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1978).
21. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1978). That section, commonly known as the "finality of payment rule,"
provides: "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course or a
person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment." Id See Note,
Finality of Payment and the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 182, 188-90 (1959) (mate-
rial alteration does not affect rule).
22. See generally Lawrence, supra note 14, at 323-31. Professor Lawrence states:
Certification is final in favor of holders in due course. For persons who do not enjoy this
status, it is not clear whether section 3-418 should be read literally to limit the benefits of
finality to those who have changed position in reliance on thepayment of the check, or
whether it should be read broadly to confer these benefits on persons who have changed
position in reliance on certpcation as well.
Id at 325 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
New York courts apparently do not extend finality to certification obtained by the drawer.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of United States, 259 N.Y. 365, 182 N.E. 18 (1932) (payee
did not change position in reliance on certification and cannot recover from bank). See also N.Y.
U.C.C. § 3-418 (McKinney 1964).
23. Greenberg v. World Exch. Bank, 227 A.D. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200, 204 (1929).
24. See H. BAILEY, supra note 7, at § 20.10. See also Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, 199 Mo.
App. 583, 205 S.W. 875, 876 (1918); Welch v. Bank of the Manhattan Co., 264 A.D. 906, 35
N.Y.S.2d 894, 895 (1942); Greenberg v. World Exch. Bank, 227 A.D. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200, 203
(1929) (pre-code cases).
If the certifying bank accedes to a request to stop payment and is then sued by the holder, the
bank should be able to assert the defenses of the drawer if it certified the check, at his request, by
"vouching in" the drawer as a party defendant under a statutory provision similar to U.C.C. § 3-
803 (1978). Murray, supra note 4, at 892 n.26 feels that "U.C.C. § 3-803 seems broad enough to
allow this result." See also The Law of Cert#Fcation ofChecks, 78 BANKING L.J. 369, 384 (1961).
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If fraud is involved courts have allowed a stop payment order, and
in lawsuits between a payee or holder and a drawee, courts have al-
lowed the drawer to be interpleaded.25 Where a check has been certi-
fied through error or by mistake and is still in the hands of the person
who procured certification, and that person has not changed his posi-
tion between certification and revocation, and the rights of third parties
have not intervened, the bank may in some instances be permitted to
revoke its certification.26
III. CASHIER'S CHECKS
A cashier's check, like a certified check, assures its payee or holder
that the instrument will be paid.27 The Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) does not specifically define a cashier's check, teller's check,
bank check, bank draft, money order, or traveler's check. 28 The deter-
mining factor is not the name given to the instrument by the bank or
Yet the Code position is that a bank is not required to stop payment on a certified check. U.C.C.
§§ 4-303(1)(a), § 4-403, comment 5 (1978).
See also Lincoln Securities v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York County 1970), where the court, relying on Carnegie Trust Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 107 N.E. 693 (1915) as authority cited the general rule that a
drawer may not stop payment on a certified check, since certification constitutes an acceptance by
the bank. In Lincoln Securities, however, there was an allegation of fraud, and the court held that
interpleader of the drawer should be allowed. Lincoln Securities, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
at 216.
25. See supra note 24.
26. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of United States, 259 N.Y. 365, 182 N.E. 18 (1932)
(certification though error and no change in position); Manhattan Co. v. Tunick, 134 Misc. 863,
237 N.Y.S. 230 (1929) (citing Mt. Morris Bank v. Twenty-Third Ward Bank, 172 N.Y. 244, 64
N.E. 810 (1902)); Irving Bank v. Wetherald & Young, 36 N.Y. 535 (1867) (certification by mistake
because of insufficient funds); Freistat v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 18 Misc. 2d 420, 186
N.Y.S.2d 768 (1958) (certified by mistake of teller, and payee had not been damaged, nor changed
his position in reliance thereon). But see Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 366
Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974), concerning the bank's right to cancel its certification. See gener-
ally 9 N.Y. JUR. 2d Banks § 377, at 615-16 (1982) (certification through error; revocability).
If a check is certified by mistake after a stop payment order, and the payee has not changed
its position in reliance upon the certification, the bank may recover from the payee. Tusso v.
Security Nat'l Bank, 76 Misc.2d 12, 349 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1973). A bank has
been allowed to revoke a mistaken certification when no third party was harmed. Plantation Bank
v. Desormier, 102 R.I. 565, 232 A.2d 371 (1967).
In Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 366 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974), the
bank was allowed to cancel and rescind its certification where there was fraud practiced by its
customer, and plaintiff was not a holder in due course; it was indicated by the court that if pay-
ment were made in cash instead of certification, the cash payment could also be rescinded. See
also, Wallach, supra note 11, at 584 n.23.
27. The U.C.C. does not define a cashier's check. The only reference to a cashier's check is
found in U.C.C. § 4-211(1)(b) (1978).
28. See Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 524, 525 (1967).
7
Beane: Rights of Drawers, Banks, and Holders in Bank Checks and Other Ca
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
19841 CASH EQUIVALENTS
the other parties. Rather, the physical characteristics of each instru-
ment must be examined to determine if the instrument is a cashier's
check. After this determination the rights and liabilities of the parties
can be ascertained.
A cashier's check may be defined as a bill of exchange or draft
drawn by a bank upon itself. The bank is both the drawer and the
drawee.29 Cashier's checks are usually issued by a bank at the request
of its customers or at the request of a non-customer purchaser.3 0 The
name of the purchaser or bank customer normally would not appear on
the instrument unless that party were also listed as the payee. If the
customer's name does appear, other than as payee, it might be included
as an informational notation. The bank customer or purchaser of the
cashier's check is called the remitter. 1
With a cashier's check, the drawer and the drawee bank are the
same and the courts and the public usually consider cashier's checks to
be the equivalent of cash.3" A cashier's check is accepted as a substitute
29. H. BAILEY, supra note 7, § 1.11; 6 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING 359 (W. Wilson, J
Vaughan, R. Thiele, & J. Dandridge eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Michie]; Fox, Stopping Pay-
ment on a Cashier's Check, 19 B.C.L. REv. 683, 683 (1978).
Most courts hold that the cashier's check is accepted in advance by the act of issuance. See
Wallach, supra note 11, at 584-85 nn. 24-30. However, there is a division of authority whether
cashier's checks are properly characterized as drafts or notes. The U.C.C. does not mention cash-
ier's checks, but does provide definitions of the terms "draft" and "note." A draft or bill of
exchange is an order to pay, whereas a note is a promise to pay. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a), (d) (1978).
Although § 3-118(a) provides "[w]here there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or a note
the holder may treat it as either," it also states "[a] draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a
note." Id
Most courts follow the view that a cashier's check drawn by a bank upon itself is a draft
accepted by the bank by the very act of issuance. Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538
F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 623-24
(7th Cir. 1973); Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959). A minority
view, however, characterizes cashier's checks as promissory notes representing the bank's promise
to pay the holder. TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero Y
Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
30. See generally Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 2 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 445, 445-46 (1975) for a discussion and description
of the subject.
31. The term "remitter" is explained in W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES 177 (2d ed. 196 1). Britton explains that under the original practice of a bill of exchange,
there were four parties involved: the drawer, drawee, payee, and the remitter. A remitter is the
person who at the outset of an instrument made payable to a payee, obtains possession of same
from the drawer or maker, for purposes of delivery to the payee.
The term remitter is not defined in the Code, but reference to a remitter is contained in the
definition of issue. "Issue" is defined as the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or a remit-
ter. U.C.C. § 3-102(l)(a) (1978). The term "issue" deals with the transfer of possession by the
drawer to the third person or remitter. See Note, supra note 28, at 540-41 and Comment, supra
note 11 for further discussion and explanation of a "remitter."
32. E.g., In re Johnson, 552 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1977); Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia
Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484
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for cash because the bank stands behind it.33 A majority of state courts
have determined that the issuance of a cashier's check becomes the pri-
mary obligation of the bank. The leading cases in New York hold that
a cashier's check is a check drawn by a bank upon itself and issued by
an authorized officer of the bank. As one case noted:
The bank, therefore, becomes both the drawer and drawee;
and the check becomes a promise by the bank to draw the
amount of the check from its own resources and to pay the
check upon demand. Thus, the issuance of the cashier's check
constitutes an acceptance by the issuing bank; and the cash-
ier's check becomes the primary obligation of the bank.34
The New York courts have further held that a cashier's check estab-
lishes a debtor-creditor relationship between the issuing bank and the
payee.35 One court concluded:
A cashier's check is . . . the primary obligation of the bank
which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon
demand. It has been said that a cashier's check is a bill of
exchange drawn by a bank upon itself, accepted in advance
by the very act of issuance.36
Most courts have adopted the general rule that a cashier's check is
not subject to countermand by either the remitter37 or the issuing
F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); State v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); National Newark & Essex Bank v.
Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 350, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970); Tranarg, C.A. v. Banca Commeri-
cale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 835-36, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1977);
Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 920, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974,
975 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); First National Bank v. Nobel, 179 Or. 26, 34, 168 P.2d 354, 366-67
(1946); Angelo v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 529 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973). See also Fox, supra
note 29, at 683-84; Lawrence, supra note 14, at 289.
33. National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordiano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327,
329 (1970).
34. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), (citing
Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 829, 318 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1971), rep'd on other grounds, 37 A.D.2d 409, 325 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1971), ad,
31 N.Y.2d 223, 335 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1972)); In re Bank of the United States, 243 A.D. 287, 291, 277
N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1935); See also Bobrick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 175 A.D. 550, 162 N.Y.S. 147
(1916), aff'd., 224 N.Y. 637, 121 N.E. 856 (1918) (in issuing a cashier's check a bank incurs a direct
primary obligation to pay on default of the drawee).
The court in Kaufman explained the use of the term "acceptance," by stating that the signa-
ture of an authorized employee of the issuing bank constitutes an acceptance under U.C.C. § 3-
410 (1): "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented." Kauf-
man, 370 F. Supp. at 278 n.5.
35. Myers v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 A.D.2d 657, 658, 345 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (1973).
36. Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415-6 (1977), affd,
44 N.Y.2d 778, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978) (quoting from In re Bank of United States, 243 A.D. 287,
291, 277 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1935)).
37. Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
[Vol. 19:612
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bank.38 Prior to a valid delivery, however, the purchaser of a cashier's
check may cause it to be cancelled,3 9 and the cashier's check is freely
returnable to the issuing bank in the hands of the remitter.4 °
A customer may order a bank to stop payment on any item for his
account,4" but a cashier's check is payable from the bank's and not the
customer's account.42 As a general rule, a bank customer has no right
to order the bank to stop payment on a cashier's check43 since the order
Milton, 382 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1967); State v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d
14,16 (Mo. 1976); Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856, 858
(1977); Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 229, 215 N.E.2d 68,
71 (1965); Fox, supra note 29, at 685.
"Since the remitter is not liable on the instrument, and it is the bank which has the liability of
a maker or drawer, the remitter is a stranger to the bank's obligation, and therefore, by definition,
the remitter has no right to countermand the payment of a cashier's check." Comment, supra note
11, at 262.
38. Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1973); Munson v.
America Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l
Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Polotsky v. Artisans Sav. Bank, 37 Del. 151, 157, 188 A. 63, 66 (1936); River-
side v. Maxa, 45 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1950); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376,
517 P.2d 123, 127 (1973); Scharz v. Twin City State Bank, 201 Kan. 539, 541, 441 P.2d 897, 899
(1968); First Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Or. 26, 54-55, 168 P.2d 354, 366 (1946).
But see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970). In Wilming-
ton Trust Co., the bank issued a cashier's check in exchange for a personal check drawn on it over
a customer's stop payment order. The court held that the bank could assert the personal defense
of failure of consideration against the payee of the cashier's check and refuse to honor the check.
The payee of the cashier's check was also the payee of the personal check. The Delaware court
held that the payee had "dealt with" the bank, and, under U.C.C. § 3-305(2), personal defenses
were good against the payee. The Wilmington Trust Co. case has been questioned by courts and
commentators. Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 624 n.8 (7th Cir.
1973). H. BAILEY, supra note 7, at § 9.13 indicated that even a holder in due course is subject to
"personal" defenses that might be asserted by a party with whom the holder has dealt directly.
For a similar holding, see Travi Constr. Corp. v. First Bristol County Nat. Bank, 405 N.E.2d 666
(Mass. 1980).
39. See Burke v. Mission Bay Yacht Sales, 214 Cal. App. 2d 723, 29 Cal. Rptr. 685, 668
(1963) (valid delivery is essential to effectiveness); Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 59 Ill. 2d
211, 319 N.E.2d 753, 757 (1974) (purchaser retains right to cancel before delivery).
40. Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 31 N.Y.2d 223, 229, 335 N.Y.S.2d 412,
416 (1972). See generally Michie, supra note 29, at 371-72.
41. U.C.C. § 4-403(l) (1978) provides:
"Customer's Right to Stop Payment:... A customer may by order to his bank stop payment
of any item payable for his account .... "
42. Pursuant to U.C.C. § 4-403 (1978), the right to stop payment is given to a "customer"
which is defined as: "Any person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to
collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank ....... U.C.C. § 4-
104(l)(e) (Emphasis added).
The customer is not a party to the cashier's check, whereas the bank is both drawer and
drawee. The item is payable for the issuing bank's account, and not for the customer's account
since the person purchasing the cashier's check may not even have an account with the bank.
43. See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3d 714, 718-22 (1980) (collecting cases denying right to
stop payment). In fact, the term "stop payment" has no application to a bank's right to refuse
payment or to a remitter's ability to compel a bank to refuse payment; the use of such term con-
fuses the real issue of whether a bank's obligation to pay a cashier's check may be avoided or
10
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comes too late if it is received after the bank has accepted the item."
Since a cashier's check is accepted when issued it is beyond the power
of a bank to place a stop payment on it.45
The first major case clearly resolving issues concerning stopping
payment of a cashier's check was Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank.6
In that case, the bank's customer requested a cashier's check payable to
plaintiff. At the time the cashier's check was issued the customer's ac-
count contained sufficient funds.47  Later a deposited item was re-
turned. The bank realized that there were insufficient funds in the
depositor's account to cover the amount of the cashier's check and
stopped payment on its cashier's check. The court referred to U.C.C.
section 4-303, and noted that since a cashier's check is accepted when
issued,48 it is beyond the power of the bank to stop payment on it.49
The court further stated that since the cashier's check was the primary
obligation of the bank it was presumed to have been issued for value,
and once the cashier's check was issued and delivered to the payee the
transaction was complete. Any failure by the bank to charge the
amount against its depositor does not affect the unconditional right of
payment afforded the payee." Cashier's checks are widely used and
readily accepted by sellers as a potential cash substitute, and so public
policy favors a rule that prohibits stopping payment on such checks.51
Since cashier's checks have been treated as the equivalent of cash,
suspended by the interposition of the purchaser's or the bank's own claims or defenses. Lawrence,
supra note 14, at 290.
44. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 681 (2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
Under U.C.C. § 4-303 (1978), a stop order arrives too late to bind the bank unless it arrives at
a reasonable time before the bank has accepted or paid the check. Since issuance of the cashier's
check operates as an acceptance, payment of the cashier's check can not be stopped once it has
been issued.
45. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Penn-
sylvania v. Curtis Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); National Newark & Essex Bank v.
Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
46. 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
47. Id at 276 n.3.
48. The court explained that issuance of a cashier's check constitutes an acceptance by the
issuing bank. Since the drawer bank and drawee bank are the same, the signature of an author-
ized employee of the issuing bank constitutes an acceptance under U.C.C. § 3-410(1), which states
in part: "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented. It must
be written on the draft, and may consist of his signature alone." (emphasis added). Therefore, since
the drawer and drawee bank are the same, the drawer's signature acts as the drawee's signature,
which acts as an acceptance upon issuance. Kaufman, 370 F. Supp. at 278 n.5.
49. Id at 278 (relying on National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347,
268 A.2d 327 (1970)).
50. Kaufman, 370 F. Supp. at 278.
51. Id at 278-79.
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most courts have prohibited the issuing bank from raising any defenses
to payment, even against holders who are not holders in due course. 2
The Kaufman court stated:
A cashier's check circulates in the commercial world as the
equivalent of cash. . . .People accept a cashier's check as a
substitute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather
than an individual. In effect, the bank becomes a guarantor
of the value of the check and pledges its resources to the pay-
ment of the amount represented upon presentation. To allow
the bank to stop payment on such an instrument would be
inconsistent with the representations it makes in issuing the
check. Such a rule would undermine the public confidence in
the bank and its checks and thereby deprive the cashier's
check of the essential incident which makes it useful. People
would no longer be willing to accept it as a substitute for cash
if they could not be sure that there would be no difficulty in
converting it into cash. 3
In a pre-U.C.C. case,54 a New York court compared cashier's checks to
certified checks, and held that a bank may not stop payment of its cash-
ier's check to assert its customer's defenses. The court reasoned that
"the requirements of stability in commerce and banking dictate that the
obligations of a bank on its cashier's checks be not lightly avoided."55
In another New York case56 a cashier's check was issued in exchange
for a certified check. Both the certified check and the cashier's check
were made out to the same payee, but the certified check was not en-
dorsed. The court held that issuing a cashier's check in exchange was
the same as paying the certified check. Thus, for all practical purposes,
52. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 289.
53. Kaufman, 370 F. Supp. at 279 (quoting from National Newark & Essex Bank v. Gior-
dano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351-52, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970)).
However, it should be noted that one author indicates that there are no U.C.C. provisions to
support the quoted statement. That author states that courts following National Newark Bank and
Kaufman have often relied upon inapplicable Code provisions which only superficially support
their judgment regarding the cash-like nature of cashier's checks. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 289.
54. Rosenbaum v. First Nat'l City Bank, 13 A.D.2d 100, 213 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1961), ag'd, 11
N.Y.2d 845, 227 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1962).
55. Rosenbaum, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The court went on to state that "we find no essential
difference between a situation where a bank certifies or makes payment on a check and the one
here where a cashier's check is issued in exchange therefor. ... Id at 101,213 N.Y.S.2d at 514
(citation omitted).
56. Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977). Even
though both instruments were made out to the same named payee, by issuing the cashier's check
in payment of a certified check without the indorsement, the drawee bank was held responsible, as
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cashier's checks are treated as the equivalent of cash.57
In the leading New York case of Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan
Bank ,58 a depositor requested the bank to stop payment on a cashier's
check.5 9 The bank refused the request without a court order. The bank
paid the check and the customer sued the bank for damages for failing
to abide by his stop payment order.6 The court concluded that "a
cashier's check is not one payable for the customer's account but rather
for the bank's account. It is the bank which is obligated on the
check."'" Although an ordinary check may be stopped if reasonable
notice is given, this is not true with a cashier's check:
A cashier's check is of a very different character. It is the pri-
mary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes its
written promise to pay upon demand. . . . [A] cashier's
check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon itself, ac-
cepted in advance by the very act of issuance.62
This line of reasoning has been followed in several other cases. 3
According to the official comments of the Uniform Commercial
Code,64 there is no right to stop payment after certification or accept-
ance. Since the bank's signature on the instrument was deemed to be
the bank's acceptance,65 the Dziurak court held there was no right to
stop payment on the cashier's check.66 However, the court commented
that "[i]n retrospect, the Bank, as a practical matter, could quite safely
57. See Able & Assoc., Inc. v. Orchard Hill Farms, 77 Ill. App. 3d 375, 395 N.E.2d 1138
(1979) (cashier's check circulates in the business world as cash); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank,
213 Kan. 372, 517 P.2d 123 (1973) (cashier's check is substitute for money); National Newark &
Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970) (cashier's check is
equivalent of cash in the commercial world).
58. 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977), aI'd, 44 N.Y.2d 778, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978).
59. The instrument was called an "official bank check", but the court referred to it as a
"cashier's check." Id at 103-04, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
60. Id at 104, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
61. Id at 105, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting from Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank &
Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973)).
62. Dziurak, 58 A.D.2d at 105, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting from In re Bank of United
States, 243 A.D. 287, 291, 277 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1935)).
63. E.g., Abilities, Inc. v. Citibank, 87 A.D.2d 831, 449 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1982); Florida Frozen
Foods v. National Comm'l Bank & Trust Co., 81 A.D.2d 978, 439 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1981); Taboada
v. Bank of Babylon, 95 Misc. 2d 1000, 408 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Suff. County Ct. 1978); Moon Over the
Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976).
64. U.C.C. § 4-403 comment 5 (1978) provides:
There is no right to stop payment after certification of a check or other acceptance of a
draft,. . . The acceptance is the drawee's own engagement to pay, and he is not required
to impair his credit by refusing payment for the convenience of the drawer.
65. The court stated that "the bank's own signature on the instrument constitutes both a draw.
ing andan acceptance .... "Dziurak, 58 A.D.2d at 106, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416) (emphasis added).
66. Id at 107, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
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have stopped payment on its cashier's check and, by interpleader, have
paid the money into court."67 This decision was affirmed by the New
York State Court of Appeals, which held that the bank was under no
legal obligation to honor a customer's stop payment order of a cashier's
check. 8
Stopping payment of cashier's checks may raise at least two differ-
ent types of problems: the bank may want to assert its own defenses or
the bank may be stopping payment at the request of the purchaser.
The bank may wish to assert its own defenses in situations when it
issues a cashier's check, receives a check payable by or to the purchaser
as consideration, and thereafter discovers that the check it received is
no good because of insufficient funds or other non-payment. A bank
may also wish to assert its own defenses when a depositor previously
issued a stop payment order on a personal check issued by the deposi-
tor and the bank pays the personal check in violation of its customer's
stop payment order by issuing the cashier's check, or where the bank
issues the cashier's check by other mistake or fraud. In any of the
above instances, the bank would want to cancel its cashier's check so
that it could assert its own defenses.69 The second problem arises when
a bank issues a cashier's check at the request of a purchaser (who acts
as remitter and who might also be a customer of the bank) and the
purchaser subsequently notifies the bank that he has a claim or defense
regarding the transfer of the instrument and requests the bank not to
honor the cashier's check.7"
67. Id at 107, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416. The court referred to U.C.C. § 3-603(1), which provides:
The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment ... to the holder
even though it is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument
unless prior to such payment... the person making the claim either supplies indemnity
deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfaction by
order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the
holder are parties...
Id (emphasis added). According to the court, the plaintiffs attorney could have proceeded with a
court order enjoining the bank from making payment, or could have provided indemnity to pro-
tect the bank. The court also indicated the bank could have stopped payment, and the bank could
then commence an interpleader. This of course, presupposes that plaintiff would first provide
indemnity to protect the bank. Dziurak, 58 A.D.2d at 107, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
Interpleader is a form of equitable relief given to a debtor (in this case the bank) who is
willing to pay but who is besieged by adverse claimants. This is the best alternative from the
standpoint of the bank, since it allows the bank to assume the position of a passive stakeholder.
Note, Blocking Payment, supra note 8, at 433-34.
68. Dziurak, 44 N.Y.2d 778, 778, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (1978) (citing Kaufman v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
69. Several such situations are explained and discussed by Wallach, supra note 11, at 587
n.35. See also Benson, supra note 30, at 450; Fox, supra note 29, at 686-87.
70. Benson, supra note 30, at 450; Fox, supra note 29, at 690-91. This is the more common
19841
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One commentator claims that when a bank claims its own de-
fenses, the key question would be whether the holder is a holder in due
course or has changed his position in reliance upon the check." If he
has, the bank would not be able to assert any personal defense, such as
the defense of failure of consideration. However, questions arise as to
whether the bank will be allowed to raise the defenses of its customers.
It is argued that a bank should not be placed in the middle of a dispute
between two parties asserting claims to the same instrument unless the
party asserting the claim against the holder supplies indemnity or ob-
tains a court order enjoining payment.72 This procedure is provided
for by the Code.73 For public relations reasons or to otherwise assist its
depositor, a bank may decide to stop payment on the cashier's check, in
which case the bank will be held responsible. In almost all situations,
the bank would be precluded from defending on the basis that the pur-
chaser or some other party had a claim or defense74 to the instrument.75
The real question regarding a bank's ability to stop payment on cash-
type of problem. See Dziurak 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977), aft'd, 44 N.Y.S, 778, 406
N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978).
71. See generally the analysis of Fox, supra note 29, at 686-87, for the distinction between a
holder in due course and one who has in good faith changed its position.
However, in Kaufman, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court did not consider plaintiffs
status as a holder in due course, although plaintiffwould not have been able to prove such status.
The court merely stated that a bank may not stop payment on a cashier's check which has been
properly issued by the bank and delivered to the payee.
72. Benson, supra note 30, at 450.
73. See U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (1978).
74. This is commonly referred to as jus teni, which means the rights of a third party.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 776 (5th ed. 1979).
75. Benson, supra note 30, at 451. U.C.C. § 3-306(d) (1978) provides:
Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course. Unless he has the rights of a holder in due
course any person takes the instrument subject to. . . (d) the defense that he or a person
through whom he holds the instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfac-
tion to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement.
The claim of any thirdperson to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any
party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for such party.
Id (emphasis added).
Official Comment 5 to that section explains the reasoning as follows:
The contract of the obligor is to pay the holder of the instrument, and the claims of other
persons against the holder are generally not his concern. He is not required to set up
such a claim as a defense, since he usually will have no satisfactory evidence of his own
on the issue; and the provision that he may not do so is intended as much for his protec-
tion as for that of the holder ....
Nothing in this section is intended to prevent the claimant from intervening in the
holder's action against the obligor or defending the action for the latter, and asserting his
claim in the course of such intervention or defense. Nothing here stated is intended to
prevent any interpleader, deposit in court or other available procedure under which the
defendant may bring the claimant into court or be discharged without himself litigating
the claim as a defense. Compare section 3-803 on vouching in other parties alleged to be
liable.
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ier's checks is whether or not the bank will be able to raise the defenses
of its customers against the holders. Those defenses could be raised if
the purchaser of the cashier's check personally defends the action
against the bank.7 6
Numerous cases have held that a cashier's check is deemed ac-
cepted in advance by the mere act of issuance, and so banks lack the
authority to terminate their duty to honor them. The courts in New
York and other jurisdictions have followed the decisions of Kaufman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank" and Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank.
78
Some courts in other jurisdictions made similar findings before Kauf-
man and Dziurak.79
For example, in Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd v. Marine Midland
Bank,8" the bank, at the request of its customer, stopped payment on
an "official check." Referring to the prior decisions of Kaufman and
Id § 3-306, comment 5.
If the purchaser supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the bank, or obtains injunctive re-
lief, then under U.C.C. § 3-603 (1978) the bank is protected. In either case, the claim of the
purchaser against the holder must be personally litigated by the purchaser. The bank may not on
its own, defend the holder's suit by resorting to claims of the purchaser. If the purchaser actually
assumes the defense after indemnifying the bank fully, the bank is entitled to the benefit of
whatever claims the purchaser has against the holder.
Under § 3-603(1), mere notice that the purchaser of the cashier's check was cheated by a third
party does not impose a duty upon the bank to decline to honor the cashier's check when
presented by the holder. The bank is not placed in the position of having to determine the merits
of such a dispute. § 3-603, comment 3, points out that "[Wihen the party to pay is notified of an
adverse claim to the instrument he has normally no means of knowing whether the assertion is
true." Thus U.C.C. § 3-603 relieves the bank of any responsibility for arbitrating the dispute.
The bank may ultimately be required to pay if the holder prevails on the merits. The indem-
nity supplied to the bank should hold the bank harmless, so that the bank suffers no loss. Presum-
ably, the customer will have litigated its claim in its own name and at its own expense. See
U.C.C. § 3-306(d), § 3-603(1), & § 3-603, comments 2 & 3.
76. See § 3-306(d) & comment 5. See also Fox, supra note 29, at 691-92.
77. 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
78. 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977), afl'd, 44 N.Y.2d 778, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978).
79. See Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'1 Bank, 538 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l
Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970); Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Youngblood, 135 Ga. App.
638, 219 S.E.2d 172 (1975); Able & Assoc., Inc. v. Orchard Hill Farms, 77 I11. App. 3d 375, 395
N.E.2d 1138 (1979); Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 211, 319 N.E.2d 753 (1974);
Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 517 P.2d 123 (1973); State v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d
14 (Mo. 1976); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327
(1970); Abilities, Inc. v. Citibank, 87 A.D.2d 831, 449 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1982); Florida Frozen Foods
v. National Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 81 A.D.2d 978, 439 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Suff. County Ct.
1978); Tranarg v. Banca Commerciale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1977); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd., v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918,
386 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust Co., 495
S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973) (all holding that cashier's check is accepted when issued, and is not subject
to countermand).
80. 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976).
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Dziurak, the court held that "[a] cashier's check is accepted in advance
by the act of issuance and that the issuing bank remains liable, after a
stop payment order, even where there is a failure of consideration in
the underlying transaction for which the check was given.
81
In rendering its decision, the court referred to the effect of U.C.C.
section 3-802, whereby a payee or other holder loses its rights against a
purchaser when it accepts a bank instrument in payment of an underly-
ing obligation, since that obligation would bepro tanto discharged.82
Section 3-802(l)(a) of the Code provides that the taking of an instru-
ment when the drawer is a bank discharges the underlying obligor un-
less there is recourse against him on the instrument. If a cashier's check
is taken as payment of an underlying obligation, the underlying obliga-
tion is discharged. If the remitter has not endorsed the cashier's check,
the holder of the cashier's check could only turn to the bank as primar-
ily liable on the instrument. In this case, the remitter-obligor would be
discharged pursuant to U.C.C. section 3-802. If the bank were allowed
to stop payment of the cashier's check without liability, the holder
would be without recourse.8 3
In Moon Over the Mountain, the court pointed out that if the bank
had been a party to the underlying obligation the reasoning relating to
thepro tanto discharge would be inapplicable.8 4 Based upon U.C.C.
section 3-802, it has been urged that a holder should have a cause of
action against a bank on the bank's primary liability.8 Furthermore,
for policy reasons, banks should not be free to refuse payment of their
obligation, "the policy considerations which underlie the UCC support
the rule that a bank must remain liable on its official check even after a
stop payment order by its customer. To hold otherwise could be a seri-
81. Id at 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
82. id at 920-22, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1978), which provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obli-
gation
(a) the obligation ispro tanto dischargedf a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the
instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underiying obligor ...
Id (emphasis added).
83. Of course the bank as drawer could still have liability as a drawer under U.C.C. § 3-
413(2) (1978).
Pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(a) (1978), the use of a "bank instrument" as payment for an
underlying obligation provides for apro tanto discharge of the underlying obligation. But, if the
instrument is in fact not paid, then in all fairness, thepro tanto discharge should not be applicable.
84. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 920, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976, n. (referring
to TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973)).
85. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd, 87 Misc. 2d at 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976. A bank issuing a
cashier's check has primary liability. An acceptor of a draft has primary liability and the bank, as
drawer, also has liability. See U.C.C. § 3-413 (1978).
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ous impediment to public reliance on our banking system. 86
A seller may avoid the restrictions placed onpro tanto discharge
and preserve his rights against the bank customer by obtaining the en-
dorsement of the remitter. This allows the seller to hold the remitter of
the instrument responsible as an indorser 87 and, in addition, preserve
the liability of the remitter on the underlying obligation.88 Under
U.C.C. section 3-802, issuance of a bank check does not discharge the
underlying obligation if the obligor is liable on the instrument.8 9 The
New York court, in Moon Over the Montain, Ltd, stated:
A cashier's check establishes a debtor-creditor relationship
between the issuing bank and the payee. . . . Unlike an or-
dinary check drawn on a specific deposit balance, a cashier's
check is an obligation of the bank which issues it and a prom-
ise to draw the amount of the check from its own resources.
The bank becomes both drawer and drawee of a cashier's
check and its issuance constitutes an acceptance." 90
The court stated in conclusion: "A bank issues its own checks in
furtherance of its business and wishes the public to accept its checks
without question."9' Therefore, a bank is not permitted to stop the pay-
ment of its cashier's check. The court stated if the bank customer (re-
mitter) had any defenses to the underlying transaction they were not
material to the dispute.92
In Taboada v. Bank of Babylon,93 the payee of a personal check
cashed the check at the drawee bank and used the proceeds to purchase
a bank "official check." 94 The bank's customer then attempted to place
a stop payment order on the check, but the bank, unable to stop pay-
86. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd, 87 Misc. 2d at 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
87. The remitter could be held responsible as an indorser on his contract of indorsement, or
under warranty.
88. The remitter would continue to be responsible on the underlying obligation, as the dis-
charge under U.C.C. § 3-802 (1978) would be inapplicable.
89. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(a) (1978). Cf. Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D.2d 103, 108,
396 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (1977), where the court stated "the statute makes no distinction between a
cashier's check presented for payment by a payee or one presented by an indorsee of the payee."
90. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd, 87 Misc. 2d at 920, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 975. The same state-
ment appears in Tranarg v. Banca Commericale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 835-36, 396 N.Y.S.2d
761, 764 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1977).
91. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd, 87 Misc. 2d at 923, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78.
92. Id at 923, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977. The court concluded that the issuance and delivery of
the cashier's check precluded the bank from asserting any defenses the remitter may have had
against the payee or the plaintiff. Id at 923-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
93. 95 Misc. 2d 1000, 408 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1978).
94. Id at 1002, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 735. Although the check was called an "official check," the
court determined that it wa a cashier's check.
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ment, refused to honor its official check. In an action to collect on the
official check, the bank argued that the check had been issued in ex-
change for its customer's personal check, thus asserting the defense of
failure of consideration (since payment on the personal check, which
was accepted in exchange, had been stopped by its customer). The
court tried to distinguish this case from the prior New York cases and
noted that no reported New York cases have approached the issue of a
bank's right to dishonor a cashier's check as between the immediate
parties.95 The court held that the cashier's check had been accepted by
issuance, as provided for in U.C.C. section 3-410. The defendant bank
could not stop payment.96 Although the bank had dealt directly with
the plaintiff-payee, the court held that it was precluded from asserting
the defense of failure of consideration.97
In the more recent case of Florida Frozen Foods v. National Com-
mercialBank & Trust Co. ,98 a check drawn by the bank's depositor was
cashed by the payee who in return received a cashier's check. Alleg-
edly, the payee took such action because it knew that the drawer of the
check, Food Fair, was about to ifie for bankruptcy.99 Food Fair did file
for bankruptcy on the same day the bank issued the cashier's check.
The bank refused to honor the cashier's check, alleging fraud on plain-
tiff's part. The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff was not obli-
gated to disclose to the defendant bank its knowledge that Food Fair
might file for bankruptcy in the near future."° Therefore there was no
fraud and the bank could not stop payment on its cashier's check.10'
In Abilities, Inc. v. Citibank,"°2 a customer requested that the
bank's official check be stopped. The check had been obtained by the
customer-remitter and made payable to the payee. Later, when a dis-
pute arose between the customer and the payee, the customer requested
that payment be stopped on the bank's official check. The bank, after
requesting the customer to sign an indemnity agreement, stopped pay-
95. Id at 1003, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 736. The immediate parties to the official check were the
payee (purchaser of the official check and plaintiff herein) and the bank (drawer and drawee of the
instrument). See 408 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
96. Id at 1004, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
97. Id
98. 81 A.D.2d 978, 439 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1981).
99. Id, at 979, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
100. Id
101. Id
102. 87 A.D.2d 831, 449 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1982). The check was called an "official check." As
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ment on its official check and issued a new check which was deposited
in the customer's account.103 When the bank was sued by the payee on
the official check, the bank attempted to assert the remitter's defense of
failure of consideration. The lower court granted plaintiff leave to
serve a supplemental summons and complaint, adding the remitter as
an additional party defendant." 4 On appeal, the remitter requested to
be vouched into the lawsuit.'0 5 The court, referring to prior New York
cases, held that a cashier's check is deemed accepted upon issuance and
a stop payment order following issuance is ineffective.' 0 6 The court
stated that "[t]he instrument is clear on its face as to the amount due,
without resort to proof of any facts outside of the instrument."0 7 Thus,
the court did not allow the bank customer to be brought into the law-
suit, and the bank was held responsible on its cashier's check.' 08 The
bank was left to pursue its remedies against its customer on the indem-
nity agreement.' 0 9 The court further held that any underlying dispute
between the payee and the remitter could be determined in a separate
lawsuit. 1o
In an earlier case a bank mistakenly issued a cashier's check to pay
a customer's note after the customer had stopped payment of the note.
The court said that if a bank pays over a stop payment order the bank
can not recover on the check from the payee but is subrogated to the
rights of a payee against a maker. The bank was thus allowed to bring
a third party action against its customer." 1
Other jurisdictions have followed the New York approach. For
103. Id, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id (referring to Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977), afd, 44 N.Y.2d 778,
406 N.Y.S.2d (1978); Taboada v. Bank of Babylon, 95 Misc. 2d 1000, 408 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Suffolk
County Dist. Ct. 1978); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd., v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918,
386 N.Y.S.2d 975 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976)).




111. Winter v. First Nat'l City Bank, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 213 (N.Y. County Ct.
1970). This lower court case has not been appealed. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the
subrogation rights and burden of proof. In Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health-Plan, Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co. of Albany, 110 Misc. 2d 320,442 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1981), a
cashier's check was issued as payment for a certificate of deposit to be purchased at another bank.
The bank faced liability for permitting the diversion of its customer's funds to an unauthorized
person. The court held that the bank had a duty of inquiry before issuing the cashier's check. The
court further held that in this situation, the bank could have stopped on the cashier's check. This
decision has not been appealed.
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example, in a Georgia case"I2 the bank had issued its cashier's check in
exchange for a check drawn by its customer. Later, the bank's deposi-
tor issued a stop payment order. The bank then demanded that the
defendant return the cashier's check, believing that it should be subro-
gated to the rights of its customer as to the proceeds of the check." 13
The court rejected this theory, holding the bank responsible on its cash-
ier's check. The issuance of the cashier's check was a payment "in cash
without any reservation of the right to revoke settlement.""14 The court
also held the acceptance of the buyer's check by the exchange of the
cashier's check was a final payment, and that the stop payment order
was too late." 5
InMeador v. Ranchmart State Bank,1 6 the Kansas Supreme Court
stated that cashier's checks circulate in the commercial world as a sub-
stitute for money, are the primary obligation of the issuing bank and
may not be countermanded." 7 In State v. Powell,"' the Missouri
Supreme Court held that a bank was not entitled to honor the stop
payment request of its customer to countermand a cashier's check, even
though the customer complained that the payee had committee
fraud.' '9 The court, referring to U.C.C. section 4-303(l)(a), stated that
once a bank accepts the item, a stop payment order cannot be
honored.'20 A cashier's check, unlike an ordinary check, is accepted by
the mere act of issuance. The court reasoned that the nature and usage
of cashier's checks in the commercial world is such that public policy
does not favor a rule which would permit stopping payment of cashier's
checks. The court followed the New York decisions of Kaufman and
Dzurak.
In National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano ,121 one of the earli-
est cases cited as authority, the defendant had signed a security agree-
ment with the bank to finance the purchase of two trucks and the bank
issued a cashier's check payable to the seller (payee). After defendant
(remitter) gave the seller the cashier's check the defendant discovered
that the trucks were defective and requested the bank to stop payment
112. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Youngblood, 135 Ga. App. 638, 219 S.E.2d 172 (1975).
113. Id at 639, 219 S.E.2d at 173.
114. Id
115. Id The court relied on U.C.C. §§ 4-213(1)(a), (b), & 4-303(I)(b ) (1978).
116. 213 Kan. 372, 517 P.2d 123 (1973).
117. Id at -, 517 P.2d at 128 (Relying on U.C.C. §§ 3-410(l), 4-303).
118. 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976).
119. Id at 16.
120. Id
121. 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
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on the cashier's check, offering to post a bond to protect the bank.'2 2
The bank refused to honor the stop payment order on the cashier's
check. The defendant thus refused to abide by the security agreement.
This was the first major decision to establish that a cashier's check is
accepted when issued.' 23 Since a stop order is ineffective after accept-
ance, payment of a cashier's check cannot be stopped. The court also
discussed the public policy regarding the use of cashier's checks.
124
Other courts have likewise based their decisions on public policy
grounds.' 25 One commentator has summarized the public policy rea-
soning as follows:
In the commercial setting, cashier's checks. . . are generally
viewed as the equivalent of cash. Creditors are ordinarily
willing to take cashier's checks in lieu of cash since these in-
struments are bank obligations rather than personal obliga-
tions of the remitter. Since it is frequently impractical and
unsafe to transfer large amounts of cash, a cashier's check
. . . serves an important commercial function. If banks were
allowed to countermand cashier's checks, the utility of such
instruments might be undermined.
126
In a Texas case, 127 Baker delivered a personal check drawn on the
bank to the payee, the American National Insurance Company, as pay-
122. Id at 349-50, 268 A.2d at 328.
123. Id at 350, 268 A.2d at 329.
124. The court referred to the prior decisions of United States v. Milton, 382 F.2d 976, 978
(6th Cir. 1967) and Causey v. Eiland, 175 Ark. 929, 1 S.W.2d 1008 (1928).
The court stated:
In addition to the statutory prohibition against stopping payment on a cashier's check,
the nature and usage of these checks require such a rule. A cashier's check circulates in
the commercial world as the equivalent of cash .... People accept a cashier's check as a
substitutefor cash because the bank stands behind it, rather than an individual. In effect,
the bank becomes a guarantor of the value of the check and pledges its resources to the
payment of the amount represented upon presentation. To allow the bank to stop pay-
ment on such an instrument would be inconsistent with the representation it makes in
issuing the check. Such a rule would undermine the public confidence in the bank and
its checks and thereby deprive the cashier's check of the essential incident which makes it
useful. People would no longer be willing to accept it as a substitutefor cash f/they could
not be sure that there would be no dficulty in converting it into cash ....
National Newark & Essex Bank, 111 N.J. Super. at 352, 268 A.2d at 329 (emphasis added).
125. See Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Able &
Assoc. Inc. v. Orchard Hill Farms, 77 Ill. App. 3d 375, 380, 395 N.E.2d 1138, 1142.(1979); State v.
Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D.2d 103, 105-06,
396 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1977), a'd, 44 N.Y.2d 778, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978); Moon Over the
Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 923-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977-78 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Or. 26, 38, 168 P.2d 354, 359 (1956) (all holding that
cashier's checks generally pass as cash in the business world).
126. Comment, Commercial Paper. Taking a Bank Money Order "For Value" Under U C. C.
Section 3-303, 63 MINN. L. REv. 983, 987 (1979). See also Benson, supra note 30, at 460-61.
127. Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust Co., 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973).
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ment of a debt. Baker then stopped payment on the personal check.
An agent for the insurance company brought the check to the defend-
ant bank and exchanged it for a cashier's check payable to the Ameri-
can National Insurance Company. After issuing the cashier's check,
the bank discovered its error and placed a stop payment on the cash-
ier's check. The court held that the bank could not stop payment on a
cashier's check once it had been issued, explaining:
A cashier's check is defined as a bill of exchange drawn by a
bank upon itself and accepted in advance by the act of its
issuance and not subject to countermand by either its pur-
chaser or the issuing bank. . . . Under the code the bank's
issuance of the check, which by definition is also acceptance,
constituted an agreement by the bank to honor the check as
presented. . . . The rule may thus be stated that a cashier's
check is accepted for payment when issued.
Under the provision of. . . § 4-303, a stop order . . .
comes too late. . . if it is received after the bank has accepted
or certified the item. Since a cashier's check is accepted when
issued, § 4-303. . . has the effect of preventing a bank to stay
payment on a cashier's check once it has been issued. 28
The court firmly stated the bank could not countermand its cashier's
check. After adopting this rule, however, the court still considered
whether or not plaintiff was a holder in due course.' 29 This reasoning
has been criticized by at least one author. 3 °
In a North Carolina case t3' a cashier's check was issued by the
bank in exchange for a personal check of its customer payable to plain-
tiff. The bank customer never actually had sufficient funds in the ac-
count, but on this particular day there appeared to be sufficient
funds. '32 The bank thus refused to honor its cashier's check. The court
128. Id at 574 (citations omitted).
129. Id
130. See Fox, supra note 29, at 688. Fox points out that if payment cannot be stopped on a
cashier's check, then there is no reason to consider plaintiffs status as a holder in due course.
"Thus, Wertz demonstrates that although courts broadly declare that payment on cashier's checks
may not be stopped, the specific holdings of such cases may indicate adherence to a much nar-
rower rule." Id
131. Lowe's of Sanford, Inc. v. Mid-South Bank & Trust Co., 44 N.C. App. 365, 260 S.E.2d
801 (1979).
132. The customer (G&G) had deposited in the account a check from another bank. Subse-
quently its account at the other bank was depleted, thereby rendering the customer's check in the
second account worthless. It was indicated that the customer's account was frequently overdrawn,
and all tellers and cashiers were instructed not to pay any checks on the G & G account without
approval of a bank officer. A teller issued the bank's official check in exchange for the G & G
check without consulting an officer. Id at 366, 260 S.E.2d at 802.
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held that a cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon
itself and accepted in advance by the act of issuance and not subject to
countermand by the purchaser or by the issuing bank.'33 In addition,
the court stated that acceptance is final in favor of a holder in due
course, which the plaintiff was determined to be. 134 The bank was thus
held responsible on its cashier's check.
In a Nebraska case,' 35 the bank issued a "money order," which the
court said was essentially the same as a cashier's check. The court held
that a cashier's check is accepted in advance by its issuance and not
subject to countermand by the purchaser or the issuing bank.'36 In
Bank of Naperville v. Catalano,'37 an Illinois case, the bank issued a
cashier's check by mistake while closing out a depositor's account. The
bank was able to sue in restitution for the return of the cashier's check
representing funds paid by mistake, when it was dealing with the payee
directly.
In two cases from different jurisdictions, courts have stated the
general rule that a bank can not stop payment on its cashier's check,
but have allowed the bank to offset its defenses against the claim. In In
re Johnson,"' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the bank to
set off, against the receiver in bankruptcy, its defenses against the
payee. In that case, the cashier's checks were indorsed by the payee to
the receiver. In Munson v. American National Bank & Trust Co. ,139 the
court held that the bank could not stop payment on its own cashier's
checks, although the court did permit the bank to offset its own claim
against plaintiff on the dishonored draft which plaintiff indorsed for
payment of the three cashier's checks.' 4°  The court stated that the
133. Id at 367, 260 S.E.2d at 802.
134. Id It should be noted that the court stated that payment of the cashier's check could not
be stopped, but then commented that acceptance is final in favor of a holder in due course, and
referred to the decision of Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Youngblood, 135 Ga. App. 638, 640, 219
S.E.2d 172, 174 (1975), where the court stated:
It is, therefore, the general rule, sustained by almost universal authority, that a payment
in the ordinary course of business of a check by a bank on which it is drawn under the
mistaken belief that the drawer has funds in the bank subject to such check is not such a
payment under a mistake of fact as will permit the bank to recover the money so paid
from the recipient of such payment.
135. Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977).
136. The court relied on Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. 86 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 408 N.E.2d 441 (1980).
138. 552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977) (applying Virginia law). The court noted that the setoffwas
not a defense on the instrument, but a setoff as a defense to the recovery, which operates as a
defense only to reduce the remedy. Id at 1078.
139. 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
140. Id at 624-25. The offset permitted was the plaintiffs liability on the indorsement con-
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bank's offset created an affirmative defense to the plaintiffs action.14'
In a recent Massachusetts case, 142 a bank customer obtained a
treasurer's check payable to plaintiff, and subsequently requested the
bank to stop payment. The court found the treasurer's check to be the
equivalent of a cashier's check. The question arose as to whether the
bank could assert against plaintiff the defenses of the remitter, its cus-
tomer. 143 The court concluded that the bank could not raise any de-
fenses of the remitter, but also suggested that it might reject an absolute
rule against dishonor of cashier's checks where claims of the remitter
are involved. 44
Other jurisdictions have followed the prohibition against a bank
countermanding its cashier's check. In Able & Associates, Inc. v.
Orchard Hill Farms, Inc. , 4 1 an Illinois case, the plaintiff had
purchased the cashier's check with a personal check on which the
drawer had stopped payment prior to plaintiffs purchase. The court
discussed the policy considerations regarding cashier's checks and de-
clared that in the business world cashier's checks are the equivalent of
cash. If a bank were allowed to stop payment on such checks, public
confidence in banks would be undermined. 46 The court was puzzled
as to whether it should follow its prior decision in Bank of Niles, 41 or
whether it should consider the issue anew.' 48 The court, in conclusion,
tract and on their warranties of transfer. See U.C.C. §§ 3-414(l) (contract of indorser); 4-207(2)
(1978) (customer's warranty to transferee and collecting bank).
141. Munson, 484 F.2d at 625.
142. Louis Falcigno Enters., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 92,
436 N.E.2d 993 (1982).
143. The court referred to the case of Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Sav. Co.,
6 Ohio Misc. 226, 215 N.E.2d 68 (1965) where the bank was allowed to raise the defenses of its
customer. Yet, in that case, the purchaser as an indorser was also liable on the instrument. In the
Louis Falcigno Enters. Inc., case, the court reviewed the different theories relating to defenses that
could be asserted, and referred specifically to U.C.C. § 3-306(d). It concluded that the bank
should be precluded from raising any contract defenses of its customer. The court was unwilling
to allow defenses broader than those permitted under U.C.C. § 3-306(d).
144. Louis Falcigno Enters., 14 Mass. App. Ct. at - 436 N.E.2d at 995.
145. 77 Ill. App. 3d 375, 395 N.E.2d 1138 (1979) (overruling Bank of Niles v. American State
Bank, 144 Ill. App. 3d 729, 303 N.E.2d 186 (1973)). The court held that cashier's checks are not,
under any circumstances, subject to countermand by the issuing bank. In so holding, the court
specifically referred to Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and
National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970) as
authority.
146. Able &Assoc., Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82, 395 N.E.2d at 1142.
147. Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 144 Ill. App. 3d 729, 303 N.E.2d 186 (1973), which
had held that payment may be stopped in certain circumstances.
148. The court stated:
We realize that Bank of Niles v. American State Bank and Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Delaware Auto Sales lend support to Union's position that it was justified in refusing to
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stated: "we believe that policy considerations require a rule which pro-
hibits a bank from refusing to honor its cashier's check." 149
In an Ohio case,' 50 an action was commenced on a cashier's check
by the holder-indorsee against the bank issuing the cashier's check.
The court held that the issuing bank may at the request of the pur-
chaser refuse payment to an indorsee if he is not a bona fide holder for
value direct from the purchaser, or has obtained the indorsement from
the payee by fraud.' 5 '
One author 5 2 has explained the judicial treatment of cashier's
checks as follows:
The principle that cashier's checks are not subject to counter-
mand, however, is not applied literally by the majority of
courts because of the harsh effect of the rule in cases in which
honor its cashier's check. These cases would allow a bank to sloppayment consistent with
those provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to holders in due course, and
we note that cases in otherjurisdictions appear to follow similar reasoning.
Able & Assoc., Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d at 379-80, 395 N.E.2d at 1140-41 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
The court went on to note that: "It appears, however, that a number of cases have interpreted
the Uniform Commercial Code differently and adhere to a contrary rule that cashier's checks are
not, under any circumstances, subject to countermand by the issuing bank." Id at 380, 395
N.E.2d at 1141 (citing Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank-Fairfax, 538 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1976); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970); Kaufman v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372,
517 P.2d 123 (1973); State v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976); National Newark & Essex Bank v.
Giordano, I ll N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust,
495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973)).
149. Able &.Assoc., 77 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82, 395 N.E.2d at 1142.
150. Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 215 N.E.2d 68
(1965).
151. The court wrote:
It is well settled that the purchaser of a cashier's check payable to one other than the
purchaser thereof has no right to countermand payment of the instrument after its issue,
except forfraud, failure of consideration, or wherepayment is stopped by injunctive order.
The defense of fraud or failure of consideration under such a situation can only be made
as between the bank and the purchaser of the check.
Id at 227, 215 N.E.2d at 70 (emphasis added).
The court also outlined the attributes of a cashier's check:
It is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon itself and accepted in advance by the act of
its issuance. It is the primary obligation of the bank and no right of countermand exists
by the purchase or payee. ...
But where the purchaser of a cashier's check is also the payee, while the right of counter-
mand does not exist, the court is of the opinion that a dtfferent rule should be applied where
the bank declines payment thereon voluntarily on the ground the purchaser's and payee's
endorsement was secured by fraud orfor failure of consideration.
Id at 229, 215 N.E.2d at 71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In the action by the indorsee of
the cashier's check against the issuing bank to recover the face amount of the check, the court held
that the bank was entitled to have the benefit of any defense that the purchaser could have against
the indorsee.
152. Comment, supra note 126, at 983-84 (footnotes omitted).
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a bank has issued a cashier's check by mistake or for insuffi-
cient consideration. While many courts continue to assert
that payment cannot be stopped on a cashier's check, most
courts allow a bank to decline payment and assert its own
defense of fraud,'53 mistake,'54 or failure of consideration"'5
against one who is not a holder in due course.' 56
There have been two general approaches to cashier's checks.
Under one approach, a cashier's check is a draft which is accepted by
the act of its issuance, and is treated as a cash equivalent, and thus
banks are not permitted to stop payment. Under the second approach,
a cashier's check is a note on which the bank as maker is primarily
liable, but the bank can assert defenses if the instrument is not in the
hands of a holder in due course. This second definition is based upon
an interpretation of U.C.C. section 3-118(a), which provides that a
draft drawn on a drawer is effective as a note.'5 7  Most courts have
chosen to treat cashier's checks as accepted drafts rather than notes.
The results may be the same whichever approach is taken. Under
U.C.C. section 3-413(l), '5 the contract of the acceptor is to pay the
153. E.g., Bank of Coffee Springs v. McGilvray & Co., 167 Ala. 408, 409-11, 52 So. 473, 473-
74 (1910) (false representation as to security given to secure loan).
154. E.g., National Bank v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 537, 140 P. 27, 30 (1914) (wrongly identified
teller approval stamp on check); Wright & Trust Co., 108 Ga. App. 783, 789, 134 S.E.2d 457, 462
(1963) (check inadvertently certified).
155. E.g., Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stock Growers' Bank, 200 F. 245, 247-48 (8th Cir.
1912); Banco Ganadero y Argicola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
National Bank v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 539, 140 P. 27, 30 (1914); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City
Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222, 1225 (1976); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware
Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41, 42 (Del. 1970); Wright v. Trust Co., 108 Ga. App. 783, 789, 134 S.E.2d
457, 462 (1963); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 144 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733-34, 303 N.E.2d
186, 189 (1973); Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 86 N.W.2d
639, 643-44 (N.D. 1957); Mid-Central Towing Co. v. National Bank, 348 P.2d 327, 329 (Okla.
1960).
It should be noted that most of the cases cited above hold that a cashier's check is a note, and
not a draft. The New York courts and many other courts have refused to follow such a holding.
See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (check
payable on demand); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d
327 (1970) (bill of exchange drawn by bank on itself).
156. Comment, supra note 126, at 987-88 & nn.25-28.
157. U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (1978) provides: "A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a note."
It has been argued that U.C.C. § 3-118(a) was intended simply to eliminate the need for a
holder of a note (or accepted draft) to give notice of dishonor or notice of protest. The section was
intended to give the holder of a cashier's check or other draft drawn on the drawer, the procedural
advantages that accrue to the holder of a note, that is, eliminating the need of the holder to present
the instrument for payment and give notice of dishonor as a condition precedent to the liability of
the drawer. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 288 n.43.
158. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) (1978) provides: "The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed pursuant to Sec-
tion 3-115 on incomplete instruments."
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instrument according to its tenor-the same contract to which the
maker of a note is bound. An acceptor of a draft is primarily liable on
the instrument, just as the maker of a note is primarily liable. The
issues of whether the holder of the cashier's check is a holder in due
course and what defenses and claims may be raised should be the same
whether the instrument is a note or an accepted draft. The maker of a
note and the acceptor of a draft both undertake the same primary lia-
bility.159 Further, the same warranties are extended by an acceptor of a
draft as are made by a maker of a note. 160 However, one noted author
has identified one area where there might be a difference. 16 1
One of the leading cases holding that a bank could effectively stop
payment on its cashier's checks is TPO Inc. v. FDIC.162 In that case
the plaintiff sued the receiver of an insolvent bank for failure to pay ten
cashier's checks issued by the bank. It was alleged that the plaintiff's
officers participated in a fraudulent scheme relating to the checks.
Since no innocent third parties, customers of the bank, or holders in
due course whose rights would be affected were involved, the court
stated that "the strong considerations of public policy favoring negotia-
bility and reliability of cashier's checks are not germane." 163 The court
held that a cashier's check is equivalent to a negotiable promissory note
of the bank, and is not the same as cash."6 The court disagreed with
and distinguished Pennsylvania v. Curtiss National Bank 165 and Newark
159. Id
160. See U.C.C. § 3-417(1) (1978) (providing for a warranty from any person obtaining pay-
ment or acceptance).
161. Professor Benson noted:
While the rights and liabilities resulting from either method of treatment of cashier's
checks appear to be the same, section 3-418 suggests an instance where they might differ.
If the holder of a cashiers' check is not a holder in due course, it would appear that
failure of consideration could be raised by the bank/maker of the cashier's check. How-
ever, can such a defense be raised by a bank which has accepted a cashier's check and is
being sued by a holder who is not a holder in due course but who has, in good faith,
changed his position in reliance on the acceptance? Section 3-418 provides in part:
[p]ayment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in due
course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the
payment.
The problem is created by the possibility that the drafters did not intend to exclude
from protection persons who in good faith relied on the acceptance, rather than on pay-
ment. The comments to the section provide no insight into the question.
Benson, supra note 30, at 452 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
162. 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973).
163. Id at 135.
164. Id at 136.
165. 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970). In that case, the payee was not a party to the agreement in
which the issuance of the cashier's check played a part, and the payee was a holder in due course.
The court, however, did recognize the possibility of a defense on the ground of failure of consider-
ation if the payee were not a holder in due course.
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National Bank.'66 The court concluded:
We think that a correct analysis of the position of the parties
here is that the Bank had engaged to pay the check but, if the
plaintiff is not a holder in due course, under § 3-306 and § 3-
408 the Bank or the FDIC is entitled to present all defenses
which would be available on a simple contract including one
of lack of consideration or fraud. 167
In Banco Ganadero,16 an Ohio federal court case, a bank asserted fail-
ure of consideration as a defense to a demand for payment when en-
forcement was sought by someone not a holder in due course. The
court said that a cashier's check was either a draft accepted on issuance
or a note, and in either case the bank was primarily liable on the instru-
ment as an acceptor of a draft or as a maker of a note. The court
followed TPO 16 9 and held that a cashier's check is more accurately
treated as a note than as an accepted draft, and so the bank could assert
its defense of failure of consideration against a person not a holder in
due course. 170
In State Bank v. American National Bank,' 7 1 the court held that
payment of a bank money order (in reality a cashier's check), 72 could
be stopped and defendant could assert the defense of failure of consid-
eration since plaintiff was not a holder in due course, 173 adopting the
166. 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
167. TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d at 136.
Willier and Hart approve ofTPO. 6E (Part 2) W. WILLIER & F. HART, BENDER'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE 2-1176.1 (1976), 2-1176.6 (1982). Those authors feel it would be
simpler and more correct to consider a cashier's check effective as a note pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-
118(a) (1978) where the bank is primarily liable as maker, and the maker can assert its defenses if
the holder is not a holder in due course.
Courts have decided similarly in the following cases: Banco Ganadero y Agricola v. Society
Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33
Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (1976); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d
41 (Del. 1970); Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Wright v. Trust Co., 108 Ga. App. 783, 134 S.E.2d 457 (1963); State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank,
266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978); Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 86 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
168. Banco Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
169. 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973).
170. 418 F. Supp. at 523-24.
171. 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978).
172. Although the instrument was called a "bank money order," the instrument was signed by
a bank, and the instrument was treated by the court as the equivalent of a cashier's check. Id at
497-98. The "money order" was given in payment of a check issued by the customer, but a stop
payment order of the customer's check had been given previously. Id
173. Id at 499-500. The reasoning of the court in this case has been criticized in Comment,
supra note 126, at 988, in its reasoning of whether the bank was entitled to stop payment because
of failure of consideration and as to whether plaintiff was a holder in due course.
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rule stated in TPO. 7 4 In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto
Sales'75 the bank raised a defense of failure of consideration in issu-
ance of a "treasurer's check".'76 The payee received a check from the
bank's customer and requested a treasurer's check from the bank in
exchange. The bank failed to notice a stop payment order on the
check. When the stop payment order was later noticed, the treasurer's
check was cancelled. The court allowed the bank to refuse to honor the
check on failure of consideration grounds.'7 7 Similarly, in a Florida
pre-Code case, a cashier's check was issued in exchange for a personal
check upon which a stop payment order had previously been issued.
The bank was able to stop payment on its cashier's check, since the
bank had dealt with the plaintiff, the original payee.' 78
In a Massachusetts case, 17 9 the plaintiff purchased a cashier's
check with a personal check received from the bank's customer (the
third party). The customer placed a stop payment order on his check
before the plaintiff exchanged it at the bank for the cashier's check.
Due to a bank error, the bank issued a cashier's check, but later refused
to honor it. The bank claimed it could refuse to honor its cashier's
check for failure of consideration when the check was presented by a
party to the instrument with whom the bank had dealt.18 0 The court
discussed the confficting views of stop payment orders on cashier's
checks which result from viewing the cashier's check as a draft, ac-
cepted when issued, or as a note.181 The court concluded that the bank
174. 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973).
175. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970).
176. The check was called a "treasurer's check," which the court interpreted and treated as a
cashier's check. Id
177. Since plaintiff (payee) dealt directly with the bank, it would not have been immune to the
defense of failure of consideration asserted by the person it had dealt with, even if it were a holder
in due course. The court held that the failure of consideration allowed the bank to refuse payment
when presented by the payee, the person with whom the bank dealt. Personal defenses may be
asserted between the immediate parties. Id at 42. The court based its decision on pre-Code cases
involving cashier's checks and was decided before TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973).
178. Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First Nat'1 Bank, 206 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (pre-
U.C.C. case).
179. Travi Const. Corp. v. First Bristol County Nat'l Bank, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 405 N.E.2d
666 (1980).
180. Id at _, 405 N.E.2d at 667. U.C.C. §§ 3-305 and 3-306 (1978) permit an obligor on an
ordinary negotiable instrument to assert any defenses against a holder with whom it has dealt,
even when the holder has the status of a holder in due course. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 294-96;
Wallach, supra note 11, at 590-9 1.
181. Travi Const. Corp., 10 Mass. App. Ct. at _ 405 N.E.2d at 668. One line of cases holds a
cashier's check is accepted upon issuance:
Those jurisdictions which apply a flat prohibition against dishonor of a cashier's check
by the issuing bank do so on the reasoning that a cashier's check is a bill of exchange or
draft drawn by a bank upon itself and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance.
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss4/2
TULSA L4W JO URAL
could refuse to honor its cashier's check and assert the defense of fail-
ure of consideration when presented by the plaintiff, with whom the
bank had dealt. 82 The court noted that there were no innocent third
parties or customers of the bank or holders in due course whose rights
would be involved, and that the strong public policy consideration in
favor of negotiability and reliability of cashier's checks did not arise.
The court therefore perceived no policy need for the application of the
rule prohibiting the bank's dishonor of its cashier's check.' 83
In Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City National Bank, 8 4 a cashier's
check issued by the defendant bank was dishonored. The customer
had purchased an "official check" (a cashier's check) for $3,446 and
paid for it with cash and with checks on an overdrawn account at the
plaintiff's bank. When the checks in payment of the cashier's check
were returned, the defendant bank stopped payment on the cashier's
check. The court referred to the TPO decision,"'5 and held that a cash-
ier's check should be considered as a note.8 6 The defense of failure of
consideration could thus be asserted against anyone not a holder in due
course.' 87 The case was remanded to decide whether the bank was a
holder in due course.188
A recent federal case 8 9 involved a cashier's check issued by a
bank to the plaintiff as proceeds of a loan obtained in part by fraud.
The court discussed the general rule not allowing a bank to stop pay-
ment on its cashier's check, 190 but noted that some courts have recog-
nized an exception if the payee dealt directly with the bank and
Because a stop-payment order must be made prior to acceptance of the instrument, Uni-
form Commercial Code, § 4-303(a), a cashier's check cannot be dishonored.
405 N.E.2d at 667. See id at 667 n.1 for cases following this theory.
The second line of cases holds a cashier's check to be a note, based upon U.C.C. § 3-118(a)
(1978), which allows a draft drawn on a bank to be treated as a note.
Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize such an iron clad rule, and they allow a bank to
dishonor its cashier's check in certain situations, primarily for a failure of consideration.
In such a case the bank may assert its own defenses against one who is not a holder in
due course.
Id at 667. See id at 667 n.2 for cases following this theory.
182. Id at 668-69. The court referred to Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271
A.2d 41 (Del. 1970) and followed TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973).
183. Travi Const. Corp., 10 Mass. App. Ct. at - 405 N.E.2d at 668 (referring to TPO Inc. .
FDIC, 487 F.2d at 135).
184. 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (1976).
185. 365 A.2d at 1224 (citing TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973)).
186. 365 A.2d at 1224.
187. Id
188. Id at 1227.
189. Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1980).
190. Id at 109-10.
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engaged in fraud to obtain the cashier's check from the bank. 91 Since
there was fraud by the plaintiff he was not a holder in due course.
"Under these circumstances, 'the strong considerations of public policy
favoring negotiability and reliability of cashier's checks' are not pres-
ent." 192 Since the plaintiff committed the fraud, the bank could stop
payment on its cashier's check.' 93
In a North Dakota case, 194 a cashier's check was received in ex-
change for another check, which was unpaid because of insufficient
funds. The defendant bank stopped payment on its cashier's check,
alleging that since no value was given plaintiff was not a holder in due
course. 95 Since this action was between the immediate parties, and no
innocent third parties were involved, the bank was permitted to assert a
lack of consideration and to stop payment of its cashier's check.'9 6
In a recent Utah case the court stated the general rule that a bank
cannot stop payment on a cashier's check.' 97 The court referred to
TPO Inc. v. FDIC'9 8 and Laurel Bank, 199 but held that plaintiff payee
was a holder in due course. 2°  The court did indicate that the bank
could stop payment if there was fraudulent conduct by the payee.2° '
Although the bank had a defense of failure of consideration against its
customer, plaintiff payee was a holder in due course who had no
knowledge of the bank's position and therefore payment could not be
stopped.2 °2
A customer of the bank has no absolute right to require the bank
to stop payment of the bank's cashier's check since the cashier's check
constitutes a primary obligation of the bank. It is not "payable for" the
customer's account, and the customer may not even be a party to the
check. If the cashier's check is deemed accepted upon its issuance the
191. Id at I10 (citing TPO as authority).
192. Id at 110, quoting from TPO, 487 F.2d at 135.
193. Id at 110-11. The court limited its reasoning to situations where the cashier's check is
presented for payment by the party whose fraud induced the bank to issue the check, and a finding
of fraud by that person is necessary. Id
194. Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 86 N.W.2d 639
(N.D. 1957).
195. Id at 644.
196. Id
197. Neve Welch Enters., Inc. v. United Bank, 628 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1981).
198. 487 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1973).
199. 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (1976).
200. 628 P.2d at 1296.
201. Id at 1297.
202. Id at 1296-97.
19841
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stop payment order comes after the acceptance. 20 3 The Comments to
the Code indicate that the drawee-bank "is not required to impair his
credit by refusing payment for the convenience of the drawer." 2°4 The
bank's liability for failing to honor its customer's request to stop pay-
ment, as opposed to the bank's liability for failing to pay its cashier's
check, is covered by U.C.C. section 3-603(1) (1978).205 One author has
argued that sections 3-306(d) and 3-603 should be amended so that a
remitter who wished payment stopped on a cashier's check would be
required to initiate court action, allowing the remitter (purchaser) to
prevent immediate dissipation of the funds by obtaining a court injunc-
tion.2" 6 That author feels the importance of the free flow and negotia-
bility of "bank checks" in business transactions should prevent the
bank customer from routinely defeating payment, and that the cus-
tomer should not be able to persuade a bank to withhold payment by
indemnifying it, since that decreases the certainty that cashier's checks
will be honored and detracts from their value as commercial tools. In-
stead, the third party claimant should be required to institute a law suit
to protect his claim.2 0 7
Another author also suggests amending the Code to ensure that
cashier's checks serve as substitutes for cash:
Guaranteeing cash equivalency for cashier's checks would re-
quire that holders take them free from all claims and virtually
all defenses. These instruments then could offer both the
finality of payment associated with cash and the security from
loss provided by specially indorsed instruments. More specif-
ically, the Code should be amended to provide that a holder
of a cashier's check takes the instrument free from all defenses
203. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1978) (stop payment order must be received before acceptance of
item by bank).
204. U.C.C. § 4-403 official comment 5 (1978).
205. § 3-603. Payment or Satisfaction.
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfac-
tion to the holder even though it is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to
the instrument unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim
either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins
payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in
which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties.
206. See Note, Blocking Payment on a Certnied, Cashier, or Bank Check, 73 MIcH. L. REV.
424, 440-43 (1974), advocating the amendment of U.C.C. § 3-603 by adding a new subsection (2)
(a). Id at 441-42. The present subsection (2) of U.C.C. § 3-603 would be changed to subsection
(3).
In addition the author advocates that U.C.C. § 3-306(d) be amended by deleting the last
phrase: "unless the third person himself defends the action for such party"and by adding instead:
"subject to the provisions of § 3-603." Id at 442.
207. Id at 440.
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of the bank, and from all claims-both legal and equitable-
and defenses of all other parties except for the defenses of
alteration and forged indorsement.
This sort of amendment, of course, would require that
banks exercise more restraint in issuing cashier's checks, since
they will be liable even if the consideration given for a check
fails. If a bank wishes to accommodate a customer by issuing
a check prior to receiving consideration, it must gauge the
good will it generates by premature issuance against the risk
of loss it incurs. Under these amendments, banks will also be
less likely to use cashier's checks as their own personal
checks. °8
It has also been suggested that the bank can be protected by per-
mitting the bank to pay the proceeds of the disputed check into
court.2 0 9 The purchaser in such case would be protected by being per-
mitted to litigate any defenses prior to the dissipation of the funds by
the holder.
IV. TELLER'S CHECKS
Another type of instrument drawn by a bank is referred to as a
"bank draft," more commonly known as a "teller's check" in the east-
ern states. A teller's check is a check drawn by a bank (usually a sav-
ings bank or a savings and loan association) upon a commercial
bank.210 The amount of the teller's check is either charged against the
purchaser's savings account or paid for by the purchaser at the time of
issuance. The name of the payee and the amount is entered by the
bank, and an authorized employee of the issuing bank signs the teller's
check as drawer. 2" A teller's check is accepted by the drawee bank
when the instrument is presented by the payee or holder.212 A teller's
check is similar to a cashier's check in that it is signed by a bank official
208. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 318 (footnote omitted).
209. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 317; Fox, supra note 29 at 695-96; Note, supra note 206, at
44041; Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Stop Payment Orders-Cashier's and Teller's
Checks, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 518, 522-23 (1978).
210. Benson, supra note 30, at 454; Lawrence, supra note 14, at 333; Note, Personal Money
Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 524, 540 (1967).
211. Note, supra note 209, at 524. Teller's checks are also used by persons who maintain
checking accounts as a means of transferring funds from savings banks. Id at 540.
212. Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 922, 386
N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976).
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and is the primary obligation of the issuing bank.2 13  Benson claims
that teller's checks serve much the same function as cashier's checks.21 4
No matter what the instrument is called, it is necessary to look at
its substance to determine who is the drawer, the drawee, the payee, the
party primarily liable on the instrument, and the extent of the liability
of the parties.2 5 The answers must be sought from the Code.
Unfortunately, the relevant U.C.C. provisions do not provide a
clear answer, since the purchaser of the teller's check is not the drawer,
but the remitter,21 6 and that person is usually not the payee. "The legal
status of the remitter developed early in the law merchant; although he
was not the payee of the instrument, he was considered its
owner. ... 217
Several New York cases have held that a bank customer may not
request the bank to stop payment of a teller's check.218 In fact, the New
York courts have treated teller's checks much like cashier's checks219 in
cases regarding the stopping of payment. The New York courts have
described a teller's check as a cash equivalent and have held, on public
policy grounds, that they could not be dishonored.2 In Moon Over the
Mountain2: 1 the court stated that the reasoning of prior cases involving
teller's checks should apply as well to a cashier's check. 2  "A bank
issues its own checks in furtherance of its business and wishes the pub-
lic to accept its checks without question 2 2 3 and so the bank should not
be able to stop payment on the check.
Teller's checks serve two functions: they are used as personal
213. Id at 922, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Teller's checks serve the same function as cashier's
checks; they differ in that the drawer and drawee are different banks.
214. Benson, supra note 30, at 457.
215. As previously indicated, there is no clear delineation in the Code of the respective rights
and duties of the purchaser, the issuing bank, and the payee or holder.
216. Note, supra note 210, at 540.
217. Id at 540. See supra note 31 for discussion of the remitter.
218. See, e.g., Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany
County Ct. 1965); Meckler v. Highland Falls Say. & Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d 407, 314 N.Y.S.2d
681 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1970); Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 150, 152 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966) (item called a cashier's check, probably
a teller's check; drawer is a savings and loan association, and drawee is a commercial bank).
219. See Comment, Commercial Law-Unform Commercial Code-Drawer-Bank of Teller's
Check Cannot Stop Payment When Not Party to Underlying Transaction, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 193,
194 n.8 (1965) ("a teller's check in New York is similar to a certified or cashier's check.")
220. See, e.g., Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 706, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 980, 982
(Albany County Ct. 1965) ("The plaintiff accepted a bank check as in the nature of cash. . . a
teller's check has generally been treated as 'cash' .... ")
221. Moon Over the Mountain, 87 Misc. 2d at 923, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
222. Id at 922, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
223. Id at 923, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78.
[Vol. 19:612
35
Beane: Rights of Drawers, Banks, and Holders in Bank Checks and Other Ca
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
CASH EQ UIVALENTS
checks by savings banks and savings and loan associations, and as
"cash equivalents" by purchasers of the checks.2"4 A drawee bank is
not liable until it accepts the check.225 A drawer bank should have the
right to stop payment on the teller's check since it is a customer of the
drawee bank.226 If a teller's check is dishonored by the drawee bank,
the holder may sue the drawer bank, which is secondarily liable.227
A noted author has discussed the dual function of a teller's check
this way:
Even though the Code manifests an apparent intention to
treat teller's checks as personal checks, it is doubtful whether
the two distinct functions that the business community assigns
teller's checks were considered when this decision was made.
If teller's checks were in fact used merely as the personal
checks of drawer banks, it would be entirely proper to give
drawer banks the rights of any other drawer of an ordinary
negotiable instrument. If, however, teller's checks are to serve
as cash substitutes as well, it is improper to give drawer banks
the same protection accorded drawers of ordinary personal
checks. This protection simply imposes too many risks on
holders of teller's checks for the checks to have any semblance
of cash equivalency. 228
Courts have recognized the problems created by the dual function
of teller's checks. The present uses of teller's checks parallel those of
cashier's checks. Since savings banks and savings and loan associations
cannot provide checking services,229 they must use teller's checks
drawn upon commercial banks in situations where commercial banks
would simply issue their own cashier's checks.
The drawer bank has the obligation to pay the amount of the
check upon receipt of any necessary notice of dishonor.230 The drawee
bank however, is not liable until it accepts the check.23 1 The drawer
bank has the right to stop payment on the check, since it is a customer
224. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 333.
225. U.C.C. § 3-409(1) (1978).
226. See U.C.C. § 4-403(1) (1978) (customer's right to stop payment) and § 4-104(e) (defini-
tion of "customer"). See also Lawrence, supra note 14, at 333; Comment, The Rights ofa Remitter,
supra note 11, at 262. A teUer's check is for the account of the drawer bank, and not for the
purchaser-remitter.
227. U.C.C. § 3-413(2) (1978).
228. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 334 (footnotes omitted).
229. Federal or state law may prohibit savings banks and savings and loan associations from
issuing and engaging in checking accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1982).
230. U.C.C. § 3-413(2) (1978).
231. Id § 3-409(1) (1978).
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of the drawee bank.2 32 The drawer bank may exercise this right when
it has a defense arising out of the issuance of the check, or simply as an
accommodation to the purchaser of the teller's check if the purchaser
has a claim or defense arising from the negotiation of the instrument.
233
If the drawer bank will not voluntarily stop payment on the check at
the purchaser's request, the purchaser may be able to stop payment by
providing an indemnity to the bank or by applying for a court order.234
When a teller's check is dishonored, the holder sues the drawer
bank.235 A drawer bank may refuse to pay a holder in due course only
if it has a real defense, or if it has a personal defense and has dealt with
the holder.236 If the holder is not a holder in due course, the drawer
bank may raise any of its own defenses and any valid claims of owner-
ship of third parties, as well as the equitable claims of a third party if
that party will defend the action for the bank. The bank may not
otherwise raise the defenses of a third party.237 In an attempt to recon-
cile the dual function of teller's checks, the courts in New York have
consistently denied drawer banks the right to raise any claims or de-
fenses of third parties,238 while permitting banks to raise their own de-
fenses, just as they could if the check were regarded as an ordinary
personal check. 39
It is virtually impossible to devise a set of rules that can completely
reconcile both functions of teller's checks. Since cashier's checks serve
primarily as cash substitutes, it might make sense to designate teller's
checks as the personal checks of the drawer bank. No amendments to
232. Id §§ 4-403(1), 4-104(e) (1978).
233. It should be noted the purchaser of a teller's check has no right to order payment stopped,
since he is not a party to the check. The purchaser may request the drawer bank to stop payment,
which the bank might do to accommodate its customer.
234. U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (1978). Cf. Id § 3-306(d) (third party defense not available to bank
which stops check).
235. A drawer is secondarily liable. Id § 3-413(2) (engages to pay upon dishonor of draft and
notice).
236. Id § 3-305(2).
237. U.C.C. § 3-306(d) (1978).
238. See Manhattan Imported Cars, Inc. v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 335
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Term 1972) (per curiam) (bank could not claim depositor's right to rescis-
sion against car dealer); Meckler v. Highland Falls Say. & Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d 407, 314
N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1970) (bank could not stop payment, at depositor's
request, of check drawn on bank's own checking account with another bank); Ruskin v. Central
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 150, 151 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966)
(bank could not stop payment on depositor's request); Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d
705, 707, 254 N.Y.S. 980, 983 (Albany County Ct. 1965) (bank, not a party to underlying transac-
tion, could not stop payment of its teller's check).
239. Rubin v. Walt Whitman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610,
610 (App. Term 1977) (per curiam).
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the Code would be necessary, since that is how the Code now treats
teller's checks. However, the courts, the public, and even banks would
have to be reeducated, since many of them currently consider teller's
checks as cash equivalents similar in nature to cashier's checks.
Many courts, in deciding whether or not a teller's check or cash-
ier's check may be stopped, have considered the effect of U.C.C. section
3-802.24 0 Section 3-802 provides that "where an instrument is taken as
payment for an underlying obligation, (a) the obligation is pro tanto
discharged if a bank is drawer, maker, or acceptor of the instrument
and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obli-
gor." '241 Thus, if the bank were allowed to stop payment on a teller's
check without liability, and there were no indorsement by the obligor
(remitter), the underlying obligation of the remitter would be dis-
charged, and there would be no recourse against the remitter. There
would also be no recourse against the bank, and the holder of the un-
paid instrument would have thus lost its rights against both the original
obligor and against the bank. No one would be responsible for the
obligation.2 42
In Malphrus v. Home Savings Bank,2 43 a Miss Kuebler obtained a
teller's check payable to plaintiff for the purchase of an automobile.
She subsequently realized the automobile was defective and requested
the defendant savings bank to stop payment. The court said that:
[b]y issuing a teller's check the defendant Savings Bank gave
to its depositor an instrument upon which the plaintiff relied
in making the sale and delivery of an automobile. The plain-
tiff did not rely on Miss Kuebler's credit but in good faith
accepted the check of a savings bank. The underlying trans-
action, as indicated above, was between the plaintiff and Miss
Kuebler. Theplaintfaccepted a bank check as in the nature of
cash. This is a procedure that is widely followed in business
transactions of many varieties throughout this area and pre-
sumably elsewhere in the State of New York. A teller's check
has generally been treated as "cash" As a business practice
such checks have been used and regarded on the same basis as
certified checks. There are, of course, legal distinctions be-
tween certified checks and teller's checks. Their respective le-
gal effects may be different under different circumstances.
240. U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(a) (1978).
241. Id
242. Supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
243. 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965).
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Here, however, there is no basis upon which to make a deter-
mination that the plaintiff should have considered the teller's
check in any different light than he would have considered a
certified check. This was a bank obligation which he received
as consideration when he delivered his merchandise. 244
The Malphrus court based its decision on U.C.C. section 3-802 and
its effect on a discharge of the underlying obligation.
The argument which the Malphrus court apparently makes
based on section 3-802(l)(a) is that since that section has the
affect (sic) in Malphrus of discharging the underlying obligor
who was the purchaser of the bank draft, then if the court
were to allow the defendant drawer to stop payment without
fear of liability to the payee, the payee would be out the
amount of the draft, the purchaser of the draft would have the
payee's automobile without the obligation to pay for it, and
the drawer would presumably have to give the amount of the
draft back to the purchaser of the draft. This argument by the
Maiphus court would seem to be well-founded since it is diffi-
cult to conceive that the drafters of UCC § 3-802 intended to
discharge the underlying obligor and preclude any recourse
by the obligee against the bank which drew the instrument.245
Malphrus has been criticized for its failure to realize the difference be-
tween the drawee's power to stop payment and its ultimate liability to
the payee or other holder.2"
Where the drawer bank is not a party to the underlying sales trans-
action it cannot claim a defense of the parties to that transaction as a
justification for stopping payment on its teller's check.247 However, if
the Savings Bank were a party to a contract with the payee for the
purchase of property or equipment, the Bank would then be considered
the actual obligor in the underlying transaction and could stop pay-
ment if it discovered fraud or had some other defense, just as an indi-
vidual may stop payment of any personal check.248
244. Id at 706, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 982 (emphasis added).
245. Benson, supra note 30, at 458 (footnote omitted).
246. Benson, supra note 30, at 458-59; Note, supra note 209, at 542.
247. Comment, supra note 219, at 195, explains that on issuing a teller's check, the drawer
Savings Bank sets aside funds immediately available for payment. The drawer Savings Bank "has
accepted the duty to pay the check upon presentment .. " Payee and drawer Savings Bank also
have an implied contractual relationship which does not concern the underlying sales transaction
between the remitter and the payee. Id at 195-96.
248. Malphrus, 44 Misc. 2d at 707, 2545 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
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A New York Court of Appeals case249 held that a teller's check,
(referred to as a bank draft)250 once purchased, is an executed sale of
credit not subject to rescission or countermand. Payment cannot be
stopped, even by mutual agreement of the drawer bank and deposi-
tor.252 As drawer, the bank had contracted to pay the holder of the
draft. Since the bank could not assert any of the remitter's defenses in
an action by the holder, any attempt to stop payment would be
futile.253
Another New York case has likewise held that "the teller's check,
delivered as the equivalent of cash, was the bank's own direct and pri-
mary obligation to plaintiff and it could not resist enforcement of its
contract in order to make a set off or counterclaim available to its
depositor." 254
In another New York case,255 a defendant bank mistakenly issued
a teller's check for a larger amount than was paid for. The bank was
able to stop payment and issue a replacement check to the customer for
the correct amount, and was able to resist payment to the plaintiff
payee. In that case, however, the bank was a party to the original
249. International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656, 189
N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959).
250. The court referred to the instrument as a bank draft, but from its characteristics it seemed
to be a teller's check.
251. International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 407, 160 N.E.2d 656,
657, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (1959), citing Bobrick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 175 A.D. 550, 553, 162
N.Y.S. 147, 149 (1916), a~f'd, 224 N.Y. 637, 121 N.E. 856 (1918).
252. 6 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 160 N.E.2d at 657, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
253. Comment, supra note 11, at 262; U.C.C. §§ 3-413(2) and § 3-306(d) (1978).
254. Manhattan Imported Cars v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d 356,
357 (App. Term 1972), citing International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160
N.E.2d 656, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959); Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254
N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965) (emphasis added).
In Manhattan Imported Cars, the bank's depositor (the remitter) purchased a teller's check
payable to plaintiff, and delivered it to plaintiff in payment for an automobile purchased by the
remitter. Later the remitter wanted to rescind the contract for the automobile and requested the
bank to dishonor the teller's check. The court concluded that the depositor-purchaser (remitter)
would be relegated to an action for rescission or damages against plaintiff with regard to the
claims of fraudulent representation or breach of warranty relating to the purchase of the automo-
bile. The bank had interpleaded the remitter, and the lower court held the funds should be held,
pending resolution of the dispute between the plaintiff and the remitter. On appeal, plaintiff was
granted judgment against the bank.
See also Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 150
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966). In Ruskin the court referred to the instrument as a cashier's
check, but it was clearly a teller's check. The court acceded to the request of the purchaser to stop
payment. When the bank was sued by the payee, the bank interpleaded the purchaser as a de-
fendant. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the payee against the bank, holding
that the check was accepted "in the nature of cash" and could not be countermanded. Id at 152.
255. Rubin v. Walt Whitman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610
(App. Term 1977).
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transaction, and the court found no evidence that plaintiff-payee was a
holder in due course or that she took the check for any underlying
obligation.256
In Fur Funtastic, Ltd v. Kearns,257 the holder of a teller's check
brought an action against the drawer bank and the remitter payee be-
cause payment was stopped. The check was drawn at the request of the
payee by the Harlem Savings Bank, as drawer, upon the savings bank's
account in a commercial bank.258 The court stated that "[i]f the check
were a cashier's check (a check drawn by the bank upon itself) author-
ity would supply an easy answer. Legally, the check is treated as a
note, accepted by the act of issuance, and payment may not be
stopped. . . .Commercially the explanation is that the bank's obliga-
tion is regarded substantially as the equivalent of money ....
The court referred to prior cases involving teller's checks2 60 in which
the payee (the holder of the check) was the plaintiff. In Fur Funtastic,
the remitter was the payee, and plaintiff (the holder) was an indorsee
(i.e., the person to whom the instrument was indorsed or negotiated).26'
The court distinguished between the remitter as payee and the plaintiff
(holder) as indorsee, saying
[t]he distinction has enormous pragmatic and legal conse-
quences. Legally acceptance of the check in payment does
not discharge the holder's rights against the remitter on the
underlying obligation as would be the result if the check were
payable to the holder. . . .Commercially the holder is no
longer receiving the bank's direct contractual obligation to it
mitigating the cash equivalency argument, and furthermore
that argument is now counterbalanced by the remitter's natu-
ral inclination to think of the check as his subject to his right
256. Id at 610. In that case, the instrument was not taken in payment of any underlying
obligation and there was no question of discharge under U.C.C. § 3-802 (1978). The court con-
cluded that "a bank will not be relieved of its obligation on an instrument drawn by it where a
dispute arises between third parties after delivery of the check in a transaction to which the bank
is not a party. . . ." Id at 611.
257. 104 Misc. 2d 1030, 430 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
258. Id at 1030, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
259. Id at 1031, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 28. A check is a draft, and perhaps the judge meant to say
draft instead of note. In any event, the remaining portions of the statement would be the same,
and for this purpose, would have the same legal effect.
260. Id at 1031, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29, citing International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust
Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959); Manhattan Imported Cars v. Dime
Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Term 1972); Meckler v. Highland Falls Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d 407, 314 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1970); Malphrus v.
Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965).
261. 104 Misc. 2d at 1031, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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to stop payment if something goes awry on the underlying
transaction.26
2
The court said the drawee bank had the right, "indeed even the
obligation," to stop payment of the teller's check at the request of the
drawer, Harlem Savings Bank.263
In Savemart, Inc. v. Bowery Savings Bank 2 4 approximately one
thousand teller's checks were either lost or stolen during a shipment to
the bank. The bank stopped payment on the teller's checks. Some of
the teller's checks were subsequently transferred to plaintiff by a third
party and plaintiff claimed to be a holder in due course.265 The court
discussed teller's checks in the commercial field:
[p]laintiff argues that a teller's check is considered in the busi-
ness world as the equivalent of cash, and if 'subject to the
same vagaries as the personal check, commerce in a great
many areas would grind to a halt.' Although it may be true
that such checks are so treated, the legal effect of delivery of a
forged teller's check may be paralleled to the delivery of
counterfeit cash. In neither case does the deliveree acquire a
claim against the issuer (the bank or the government).
Teller's checks are obviously more secure, if duly authorized,
than most personal checks, as the resources of the bank are
available for payment with the result that, except in a case of
a bank failure, there is no problem of a teller's check being
dishonored for insufficient funds. Moreover, payment of such
checks, if validly issued, may not be stopped. Thus, although a
teller's check is obviously much safer to accept than a per-
sonal check, they are not 100% safe as the payee is subject to
the defense of forgery.266 (emphasis added)
The court in Malphrus concluded that a bank might have the right to
stop payment on a teller's check, but only if the drawer bank is an
actual party to the transaction which gives rise to the issuance of the
check.267 If the drawer Bank were engaged in a contract for the
262. Id at 1031-32, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
263. Id at 1032, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 29. Fur Funtastic involved motions for summary judgment.
Both motions were denied, on the grounds that the drawer (Harlem Savings Bank) might stiff be
liable on the check pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-413(2) (1978) as a drawer.
264. 111 Misc. 2d 1071, 445 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.)af'd, 117 Misc.2d 947, 461 N.Y.S.2d
144 (App. Term 1982).
265. Id at 1071, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
266. Id at 1072-73, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 964. In that case, the court had to consider the issue of
the forgery, in addition to the question of whether the bank was negligent in its precautions during
the shipment of the checks.
267. Malphrus, 44 Misc. 2d at 707, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
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purchase of property or equipment, it would be regarded as the actual
obligor and could stop payment if it discovered fraud, or if any ques-
tion arose as to the consideration.268 However, in Malphrus the drawer
Savings Bank "sold an instrument which was used exactly as one might
use cash or a certified check. '269 Courts have referred to teller's checks
as cash equivalents, similar to cashier's checks.27° Several authors have
criticized the New York court decisions for their failure "to recognize
the difference between the drawer bank's power to stop payment and its
ultimate liability to the payee or other holder of the teller's check."'2 7 1
In Fulton National Bank v. Delco Corp. 272 a "bank draft" was is-
sued to the payee at the request of the remitter. A dispute later arose,
and the remitter requested the drawer bank to stop payment. The re-
mitter defended the action on behalf of the bank.273 The third party
defenses were available to the bank, since the remitter was defending
the action on the bank's behalf, and the bank's ultimate liability de-
pended on the defenses of the remitter.274 The court discussed the Mal-
phrus holding that the bank would be unconditionally liable to the
holder on a teller's check, and that the bank could then seek reimburse-
ment in a separate action against the remitter who stopped payment.
The remitter could then sue the holder for its damages in a separate
lawsuit.275 The court concluded that the better procedure was to allow
the issues to be tried in one lawsuit.276
New Jersey courts have also considered whether payment of a
teller's check may be stopped.277 In Bruno v. Collective Federal Savings
268. Id
269. Id
270. Manhattan Imported Cars v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d 356,
357 (App. Term 1972) (teller's check equivalent to cash); Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc.
2d 705, 706, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (Albany County Ct. 1965) (teller's check equivalent to cash);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 449.
271. Benson, supra note 30, at 458-59, discussing Rosenthal, Negotiabiliy- Who Needs It?, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 388 (1971) and Note, PersonalMoney Orders and Teller's Checks, supra note
210, at 542.
272. 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973). The instrument, called a "bank draft," was
drawn by Fulton National Bank on its account at a Federal Reserve Bank, making it a teller's
check. 195 S.E.2d at 456.
273. Id at 19, 195 S.E.2d at 457.
274. Since the remitter was defending the action, the restrictions of U.C.C. § 3-306(d) (1978)
would not apply. The defenses of the third party would be presented to the court since the third
party is defending the action.
275. The court noted that Malphrus has been criticized, and also stated that Malphrus (a New
York case) would not be binding upon a Georgia court. 128 Ga. App. at 20, 195 S.E.2d at 457.
276. 128 Ga. App. at 20, 195 S.E.2d at 457-58.
277. Bruno v. Collective Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 147 N.J. Super 115, 370 A.2d 874 (1977).
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& Loan Association,278 defendant bank was the drawer, a Federal
Home Loan Bank was drawee, and Samuel Cicero was the payee. The
plaintiff (remitter) was not a party to the check. The check was cashed
at another branch on the same day that the plaintiff attempted to have
the payment stopped. The court treated the teller's check as a different
kind of instrument than a cashier's check and the plaintiff was allowed
to stop payment of the check.2 79
Courts have recognized the problems created by the dual function
of teller's checks as both a cash equivalent and the personal check of
the drawer savings bank. The drawer's right to stop payment depends
on which function the particular teller's check serves.280
V. PERSONAL MONEY ORDERS
Another instrument, called a "personal money order," or some-
times known as a "register check," is an instrument issued by a bank
for an amount of money deposited with it by the check's purchaser.281
A money order shows the name of the bank as drawee, the date, and
the amount, but the instrument has several blank spaces. For example,
the name of the payee and the name of the drawer are left blank, and
the instrument in effect creates the same debtor-creditor relationship
between the bank and its customer which any ordinary deposit of funds
would create. A personal money order is not signed by the bank and
resembles an ordinary check rather than a cashier's, teller's, treasurer's,
or official check. A personal money order or register check is very
278. Id
279. In coming to its decision, the court made an unusual comparison. On a cashier's check,
payment cannot be stopped, but the New Jersey court held that on a bank check (a check drawn
by one bank on its account in another bank) payment could be stopped, referring to the prior New
Jersey case of Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Fort Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213 A.2d 315
(1965). Bruno, 147 NJ. Super. at 122, 370 A.2d at 877 n.2. The New Jersey court based its
decision on its prior 1965 holding relating to teller's checks without considering several more
recent New York cases.
This author disagrees with the analogy in Bruno, since the same rules apply or should apply
as to the stop payment rights on a cashier's check or a teller's check. However, evidently New
Jersey treats a cashier's check quite differently from a teller's check.
280. Malphrus, 44 Misc. 2d at 707, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982-83. See text accompanying notes
226-240, supra. One author feels banks which desire to control their checks by stopping payment
should use teller's checks, instead of cashier's checks. The rule would be that payment on cash-
ier's checks cannot be stopped, but payment on teller's checks (which are the personal checks of a
drawer bank) can be stopped. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 319. This might clarify the dual func-
tion of teller's checks.
281. "Such instruments are also often purchased from stores and other sales outlets main-
tained off bank premises." Bailey, Bank Personal Money Orders As Bank Obligations, 81 BANK-
ING L.J. 669, 670 (1964).
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often confused with a "bank money order" (which may also be a
teller's check) by the courts and by leading authorities, making it diffi-
cult to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.82
The personal money order or "register check" was first developed
in 1937.283 The money order serves the financial needs of individuals
with no banking connections, or in no position to maintain a continu-
ous checking account relationship. 84 A personal money order has
been called a "poor man's checking account"28  or a one-time checking
account.2 86 The New York Court of Appeals has held that a personal
money order is not the equivalent of a cashier's check or teller's check.
In fact, a personal money order is legally akin to an ordinary or per-
sonal check; it is not the obligation of the bank, which neither signs nor
issues the check, but only sells it.287 The bank's name and address is
printed on the personal money order, just as the bank's name and ad-
dress appear on personal checking accounts.
The first major New York case determining the rights and liabili-
ties of a bank in issuing a personal money order was Garden Check
Cashing Service, Inc. v. First National City Bank.288 In Garden Check
Cashing Service the instrument was called a "register check-personal
money order. '2 89 The purchaser bought the money order from a bank
and on the same day reported to the bank that the check had been lost,
requesting that payment be stopped. The defendant stopped payment
on the check, and delivered to the customer a cashier's check for the
same amount. The register check was subsequently transferred to
plaintiff. The court's dilemma was whether to treat the instrument as a
cashier's check, upon which the bank is primarily liable, or as the
equivalent of a check from a personal checking account, upon which
the purchaser would have the right to stop payment. The court decided
282. See, e.g., Hong Kong Importers, Inc. v. American Express Co., 301 So. 2d 707, 709 (La.
1974) ("money order" may be issued by a governmental agency, by a bank, which may issue a
"bank money order" or a "personal money order", or by a private person); 2 R. ANDERSON,
ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104:20 (1971).
283. Note, supra note 210, at 525; amicus curiae Brief filed in Appellate Division by New York
State Banker's Association at 8, Berler v. Barclays Bank, 82 A.D.2d 437, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
284. Bailey, Bank PersonalMoney Orders, supra note 281, at 671; Note, supra note 210, at 527.
285. Bailey, Bank Personal Money Orders, supra note 281, at 671.
286. See, e.g., Berler v. Barclays Bank, 82 A.D.2d 437, 440, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981); Wallach, supra note 13, at 579 n. 1.
287. Garden Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 25 A.D.2d 137, 267
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (1966), afl-d, 18 N.Y.2d 941, 223 N.E.2d 566, 277 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1966).
288. Id
289. Id at 139, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
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that the personal money order-register check issued by the bank should
be treated like a personal checking account maintained by a depositor
in that bank.2 90
We see small difference between the present transaction and
one where a person deposits with a bank a sum of money and
receives a quantity of blank checks. The obvious difference is
that here a single deposit was made and a single blank check
received with the amount of the deposit inserted herein.
Thereafter the procedure followed the normal and customary
pattern-the purchaser filled in the name of the payee, signed
his name and address and delivered the instrument. There-
upon, it became a negotiable instrument subject to all the
rights and provisions of the [statute]. Defendant for its own
purposes may have coined the words "Personal Money Or-
der" and "Register Check" appearing on the instrument but
these words in no way altered the applicable legal principles.
The purchaser under his contract with defendant was the sole
person who might draw on the funds and had the clear right
to stop payment prior to acceptance by the bank. . . a right
• . . accorded a bank's customer by statute (Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 4-403).291
The drawee enters into no contractual relations with the holder
unless and until the instrument is accepted. The purchaser of the in-
strument may effectively stop payment prior to presentation to the
drawee by the holder. The purchaser of such an instrument is very
often unknown to the bank. The purchaser may not even maintain a
checking account or any other account relationship with the bank. In-
stead, he may purchase the personal money order whenever he needs a
check, and the purchase may be from any bank that may be convenient
at the time. The purchaser does not have to provide any identification
to the bank and, in fact, the purchaser may be an imposter.z92
Several other cases in New York have followed Garden Check
Cashing Service.293  In a recent New York case,294 an imposter
290. Id at 141, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
291. Id at 141, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
292. See, e.g., Berler, 82 A.D.2d 437, 440, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56.
293. See, e.g., id; Krom v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 38 A.D.2d 871,329 N.Y.S.2d
91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Rutyna v. National Bank, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 167 (App.
Term 1971); Maratea v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); McLaughlin v. Franklin Soe'y Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969); Lupowitz v. New York Bank for Say., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 851 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968). One lower New York case refused to follow the holding in
Garden Cheek Cashing Service. However, that decision has never been appealed and is merely a
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purchased personal money orders, subsequently appeared at the bank,
filled out an affidavit stating the checks had been lost, and requested
that payment be stopped. The alleged customer thereafter received
three replacement personal money orders payable to the customer's or-
der. The next day the original personal money orders were negotiated
to plaintiff for the purchase of merchandise. The lower court consid-
ered whether to require proof of negligence on the part of the bank in
failing to determine who the true customer was when the affidavits of
loss were submitted. The court stated:
[m]ore to the point there could be no negligence because neg-
ligence implies a duty breached. Defendant bank owed plain-
tiff no duty. The bank's duty was to its customer, imposter
though she may have been. She purchased the money order.
She had a right to stop its payment. Defendant was acting
strictly in accordance with its statutory rights and obligations
A bank is liable at its peril to obey any stop order
295
The court also noted:
[o ]ersonal money orders have been described as the poor man's
one-shot checking account. They are personal checks, not
banker's or cashier's or traveler's checks. Although they have
a more formal appearance than the usual personal check,
such appearance does not change their character or the rights
and obligations of those who issue and receive them. On their
face they are plainly signed by the drawer, not by the bank.
They clearly direct the bank to pay the payee. They are not
lower court decision. See Mirabile v. Udoh, 92 Misc. 2d 168, 169, 399 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (King's
County Civ. Ct. 1977) (since merchants treat personal money orders as bank checks public policy
requires that personal money orders be treated as bank checks.) That case contradicts Garden
Check Cashing Service, which was decided by the Court of Appeals in New York.
An Arkansas court, following the decision ofMirabile v. Udoh, and other older lower court
decisions in New York (before Garden Check Cashing Service) has held that payment may not be
stopped on a personal money order, at least where the bank attempts to stop payment on its own
initiative. Sequoyah State Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 274 Ark. 1, 621 S.W.2d 683 (1981). In that
case, the issuing bank stopped payment on a personal money order it had issued in exchange for a
"hot" check. The money order was then in the hands of another bank, a holder in due course.
This decision has been criticized by H. BAILEY, supra note 7, at 20-13 n.35 (Supp. 1983) because
the court made the fundamental error of regarding a personal money order as a cashier's check.
This case includes a strong dissenting opinion which reflects the view of most other courts that
personal money orders are similar to an ordinary check. The dissenting opinion concluded that
"[t]he master purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code is to clarify the law governing commer-
cial transactions. The tragedy of this case is that both the purpose and the code are emaciated for
no reason." 274 Ark. at _ 621 S.W.2d at 686.
294. Berler, 82 A.D.2d 437, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1981).
295. Id at 440,442 N.Y.S.2d at 56. The court cited American Defense Soc'y v. Sherman Nat'l
Bank, 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919), as authority.
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promises by the bank that it will pay.2 9 6
Prior to acceptance of a check by the drawee bank, a drawee bank
owes a duty only to its depositor (or drawer). A payee or holder (after
a dishonor) is relegated to an action on the instrument against the
drawer, and cannot proceed against the drawee bank. The drawee
bank is merely a depository, and is not liable to potential payees or
holders because it supplied its customer with a checkbook and some
blank checks. The drawee bank has not signed the check and has made
no commitment to the payee. The drawee bank becomes responsible
on the check only after it has accepted it. Similarly, the mere delivery
of a personal money order by the drawer to the payee prior to accept-
ance by the drawee bank does not create any new relationship, duty, or
obligation between the payee and the drawee bank.
In one New Jersey case,297 a personal money order was purchased
by a customer who later stopped payment and signed an indemnity that
the money order was lost. The court held that the personal money or-
der was like a personal check,298 and that the drawer could stop pay-
ment before acceptance by the drawee.2 99  In an Ohio case,3" the
plaintiff (purchaser of the money orders) became drunk and lost them.
The next day he notified the defendant bank and requested it to stop
payment of the two money orders. The money orders were paid by the
bank on a forged signature. The bank claimed that plaintiff's negli-
gence (his drinking) contributed to the loss. However, the court said
that money orders are similar to personal checks. When the plaintiff
requested the money orders the request form included the signature of
the drawer. Upon the drawer's request to stop payment of the two
money orders the defendant bank was required to stop payment. °1
The court relied upon Garden Check Cashing Service and held the bank
responsible to plaintiff as drawer, since the bank had paid the money
orders despite the forgery. In a Louisiana case involving stolen per-
sonal money orders, the plaintiff could not prove its status as a holder
in due course since the instrument was incomplete when it was trans-
296. 82 A.D.2d at 440, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 56 (emphasis added). See generally Note, supra note
210, at 525-40 (general discussion of money orders).
297. Newman v. First Nat'l State Bank, 173 N.J. Super. 598, 414 A.2d 1367 (1980).
298. Id at 601-02, 414 A.2d at 1368. The court followed Garden Check Cashing Service as
authority.
299. Id at 602, 414 A.2d at 1369, citing American Defense Soc'y.
300. Thompson v Lake County Natl Bank, 47 Ohio App. 2d 249, 353 N.E.2d 895 (1975).
301. Id at _ 353 N.E.2d at 898.
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ferred to the plaintiff.30 2
In a recent New York case,303 Sony Corporation as payee of
money orders sued the selling bank and issuing institution for money
orders that allegedly were paid over forged indorsements. Levi had
purchased three American Express money orders at the Merchants
Bank, payable to the Sony Corporation. Levi mailed the money orders
to Sony, but they were stolen. 3°  The court determined the instruments
to be personal money orders, and the selling bank's motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted. The court noted that "[t]he personal
money order is treated and considered as a personal check and fulfills
that purpose for those who cannot afford or who little need to maintain
checking accounts. '305  The court concluded that the purchaser of a
personal money order has the same rights as the drawer of a personal
check, °3 and that the plaintiff as payee could hold the drawee responsi-
ble for conversion in paying a check on a forged indorsement. 0 7
In a New York federal court case, twenty-seven money orders
worth $1000 each were purchased by a customer from a bank. Subse-
quently the customer issued a stop payment order to the bank and the
bank refunded the amount by official check to its customer. 30 8 The
money orders subsequently were presented for payment by plaintiff.
Payment was refused and the lawsuit was instituted.30 9 The court, re-
ferring to Berler v. Barclays Bank and Garden Check Cashing Service,
stated that the bank's obligation was to its customer, and that the bank
was under a statutory duty to stop payment at the customer's request,
since under New York law the customer had the power to stop pay-
302. Hong Kong Importers, Inc. v. American Express Co., 301 So. 2d 707, 710 (La. Ct. App.
1974).
303. Sony Corp. v. American Express Co., 115 Misc. 2d 1060, 455 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1982).
304. The case states that the thief, Taylor "apparently added himself as copayee ... ." and
indorsed and cashed the money orders. Id at 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 228. If that was the case, in
addition to the problem of paying on a forged indorsement, there should also have been the de-
fense of a material alteration of an instrument. The court did not mention the material alteration.
305. Id at 1062, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 229, citing Berler v. Barclays Bank, 82 A.D.2d 437, 442
N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
306. 115 Misc. 2d at 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
307. Id at 1063-64, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 229-30. See U.C.C. § 3-419(l)(c) (1978) for the payee's
rights against the drawee bank on conversion.
308. United Apparel Distrib., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 548 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
309. The money orders either were endorsed to plaintiff or were made payable to plaintiff. Id
at 673. It is not clear which, since the court made both statements. In either case, plaintiff is a
holder of the 27 money orders, which either were endorsed to plaintiff by the customer, or were
made payable to plaintiff as payee.
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ment until the bank made the payment.31° The bank was not responsi-
ble to plaintiff, since money orders are not obligations of the bank. The
bank is not responsible until the money orders are signed by a bank
official or accepted by the bank.31
1
VI. TRAVELER'S CHECKS
Traveler's check advertisements assure potential customers that
the instruments are safe against loss or theft, provided the purchaser
follows instructions for their issuance and use. Traveler's checks were
created in 1891 by the American Express Company.312 Although trav-
eler's checks have been in existence almost a century, they still are re-
garded as something of an anomaly. The precise legal characteristics
of traveler's checks have not yet been determined.313 The original pur-
pose of the traveler's check was to create a piece of negotiable paper
that would be almost as acceptable as currency yet safeguarded against
lOSS. 3 14 Some cases have indicated a traveler's check is similar to a
cashier's check,315 and at least one court has described a traveler's
check as currency.316 Traveler's checks appear to satisfy the require-
ments of a negotiable instrument. 317 They are regarded by merchants
310. Id at 673, citing U.C.C. § 4-403(1) (1978).
311. Id at 673.
312. See, Travelers Checque--Reference Guide issued by American Express, at 5-6 (1945);
Hawkland, American Travelers Checks, 84 BANKING L.J. 377, 378 (1967). It should be noted that
"travelers checks" have also been spelled as follows: "travelers cheques", "traveler's checks", and
"traveler's cheques", depending upon the issuer, the court, and the author. No matter how it is
spelled, the rights and obligations of the parties are the same.
313. Hawkland, supra note 312, at 378. Hawkland feels this is due in large part to the fact that
cases involving travelers checks rarely come before the courts because "their issuers have pursued
a policy of promoting saleability and marketability by sustaining losses in doubtful cases." Id
See Annot., Rights of One Who Acquires Lost or Stolen Traveler's Checks, 42 A.L.R.3d 846 (1972).
314. A. HATCH, AMERICAN EXPRESS 93 (1950).
The original American Express traveler's checks included instructions on their use "and the
unqualified guaranty. . . that no one should suffer loss who cashed an American Express Travel-
ers Cheque in good faith and with reasonable care. Even though the cheque had been stolen and
the signature forged, American Express promised to redeem the cheque and pocket the loss." d
at 94-95 (1950).
315. See, e.g., Mellon Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 88 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.) cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 702 (1937).
316. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 179 Okla. 606, 67 P.2d
55 (1937). Traveler's checks were stolen from the selling agent, and subsequently transferred to a
holder in due course who was able to sustain its claim against American Express. The traveler's
checks were duly signed by an officer of American Express Co., but with the spaces for signature,
countersignature and payee left blank. It was argued the selling agent and issuer were negligent,
but no such finding was made. Id at 607-08, 67 P.2d at 56-57.
317. See Note, Negotiability of Traveler's Checks, 47 YALE L.J. 470 (1938) (whether traveler's
checks should be considered negotiable instruments). H. BAILEY, supra note 7, says "the exact
nature of a traveler's check as a negotiable instrument is not completely clear." However, Bailey
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and travelers all over the world as a special category of negotiable in-
strument. 18 Traveler's checks are covered by Article 3 of the Code.31 9
A traveler's check typically is signed by an officer of the company, or-
dering the company to pay on demand at the company's office; it con-
tains a serial number, and four blank spaces for the date, name of the
payee, signature of purchaser, and countersignature of purchaser. 2
In an older New York case, the court held that the issuer was re-
sponsible for paying traveler's checks on a forged signature, since this
was a breach of the contractual obligation between the issuer and the
purchaser.3 21 Another New York court held that the issuing Bank
would have to pay certain checks which had been stolen in blank from
the selling agent, signed and countersigned, and transferred to a holder
in due course. 322 A traveler's check presented by a holder in due course
which had been signed and countersigned by the same person must be
paid by the issuing bank, even if the bank has knowledge that the trav-
eler's check has been stolen.323 Absent any showing of bad faith on the
part of the holder, the bank must pay such instrument when presented
by a holder in due course. If this were not the case, the check would
lose its value as a substitute for cash.324 At the time the checks were
delivered to defendant, it was made clear that the checks were to be
guarded like cash.325 The New York court followed an Oklahoma case
decided in 1937,326 and noted that the U.C.C. appears to adopt a ruling
that the instrument is "not incomplete in the hands of the selling agent
because nothing remained to be done either by issuer or selling
does acknowledge that traveler's checks "have negotiable characteristics through custom and us-
age." Id § 2.1 at 2-3.
318. Pellinger, Travellers' Cheques and the Law, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 132, 134 (1969). This
article includes a detailed comparison of several different types of traveler's checks currently in
use.
319. This is made clear in U.C.C. § 3-104 official comment 4 (1978) which states that
"[t]raveler's checks in the usual form. . . are negotiable instruments under this article, when they
have been completed by the identifying signature."
320. Hawkland, supra note 312, at 379-80.
321. Sullivan v. Knauth, 220 N.Y. 216, 115 N.E. 460 (1917).
322. First Nat'l City Bank v. American Broadcasting Co., 68 Misc. 2d 861, 328 N.Y.S.2d 326,
330 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971). The action was brought by the issuer of traveler's checks (Ci-
tibank) for the face value of several checks signed by it and issued in blank to its selling agent
(American Broadcasting) with authority to sell the checks. The checks allegedly were stolen while
in the custody of the defendant, the selling agent.
323. Id, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
324. Id, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31.
325. Id at 863, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 329. Since the "blank checks were the equivalent of cash," the
selling agent's safeguards were not sufficient. The court found defendant was negligent. Id
326. Id, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 330, citing American Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co.,
179 Okla. 606, 67 P.2d 55 (1937).
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agent." '327 The court rejected a New York case decided before the
adoption of the U.C.C.328 Therefore, the issuing bank would have to
pay a check stolen in blank from its selling agent if it was properly
signed, countersigned, and transferred to a holder in due course.3
29
In another New York case, 330 plaintiff lost traveler's checks which
had not yet been signed. He immediately notified defendant of the
loss. The checks subsequently were paid by defendant bank when
presented with a matching signature and countersignature of a different
person. The bank claimed plaintiff breached his contract by not sign-
ing the checks in advance. However, this was the plaintiff's first
purchase of traveler's checks and the court held the defendant had not
given the plaintiff sufficient warning and notice. Furthermore, since
plaintiff relied on the defendant's advertisements that "all traveler's
checks would be paid without loss to the original purchaser and are




In Rubin v. American Express Co. ,332 plaintiff's assignor purchased
traveler's checks from the defendant, lost them, reported the loss to de-
fendant, and filed affidavits with the issuer. The company refused to
pay, claiming it was not satisfied the checks were lost. The court
granted summary judgment to plaintiff.333 A California court has
stated that a bank which represents to prospective purchasers that there
is no time limit within which its traveler's checks must be presented
327. 68 Misc. 2d at 863, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
328. First Nat'l City Bank v. Frederics-Hilton Travel Service Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 1041, 209
N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961) (decided under the Negotiable Instruments Law). The
court held there was no "delivery" because the traveler's checks were incomplete.
U.C.C. §§ 3-115 and 3-407 (1978) provide that nondelivery of an incomplete instrument cre-
ates only a personal defense, which may be cut off by a holder in due course.
329. First Natl City Bank, 68 Misc. 2d at 864-65, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 330. The court relied on
U.C.C. § 3-407(3) (1978), allowing a holder in due course to complete and enforce an incomplete
instrument.
330. Rosenfeld v. First Nat'l City Bank, 65 Misc. 2d 722, 319 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1971).
331. Id at -, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40. This case was brought in the Small Claims Court. In
light of the circumstances, the court held plaintiff was not subject to the alleged contractual provi-
sions of defendant's form, which were printed in small type on the reverse side of the form. Id
332. Rubin v. American Express Co., 64 Misc. 2d 470, 315 N.Y.S.2d 89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970),
mod#Fed, 67 Misc. 2d 332, 324 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Term 1971).
333. Id The trial court held that defendant had over a year to investigate and submit proof
that no loss occurred. The appellate court said that "the requirements of stability in the use of
traveler's checks as well as the defendant's agreement to replace those lost dictate that its obliga-
tion not be avoided on the mere assertion of a suspicion of fraud." The appellate court affirmed,
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cannot presume outstanding checks have been lost or stolen even after
more than four years.334
In a New Jersey case,335 traveler's checks were stolen from the safe
of the selling agent. The court held that traveler's checks are the
equivalent of money and were considered cash. The issuer was re-
quired to pay any bona fide holder, and stolen checks presented by a
bona fide holder would be honored.33 6
In Fischer v. Citicorp Serv. Inc., the purchaser, a seventy-five year
old man, was the victim of a flim-flam scam and received an empty
bundle in return for his traveler's checks.337 He went to the police,
notified the bank to stop payment on the traveler's checks, and filed an
application for a refund. The bank claimed that it only refunded if the
checks were lost or stolen. The court denied the bank's motion for
summary judgment and held that the traveler's checks were stolen, that
plaintiff was the victim of a theft, and that he was not involved in any
illegal transaction.338
In Ashford v. Thomas Cook & Son, Ltd, traveler's checks were
sold to Mr. and Mrs. Kochton and delivered to their home. The wife's
checks, which she had not yet signed, were stolen, and subsequently
sold to plaintiff. The issuer of the checks refused to pay plaintiff. The
court held that plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser and acquired good
title to the stolen checks and that defendant was liable for the face
value of the checks. 340 The court stated:
[i]t is common knowledge that any establishment issuing trav-
elers checks intends its checks to be readily and freely passa-
ble from one person to another as money. This is not only
intended, but it is widely advertised that travelers checks are
readily accepted in commerce as money and that they are
safer. The public is made to believe that travelers checks are
a substitute for money, a medium of exchange, which are self-
identifying and accepted everywhere, but, unlike currency,
334. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Cranston, 252 Cal. App. 2d 208, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 336, 339 (1967).
335. American Express Co. v. Rona Travel Serv., Inc., 77 N.J. Super. 566, 187 A.2d 206
(1962).
336. Id at 576, 187 A.2d at 212. The plaintiff, American Express, was asserting liability
against defendant on its trust receipt.
337. Fischer v. Citicorp. Serv. Inc., 107 Misc.2d 307, 433 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1980).
338. The court considered the New York Penal Law § 155.02 definition of a theft and deter-
mined that plaintiff was the victim of a theft, and thus the checks were stolen. Id
339. 52 Hawaii 113, 471 P.2d 530 (1970).
340. 471 P.2d at 536.
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they can be carried without danger of loss or theft because of
the protective device of signature and countersignature. We
believe that if travelers checks are intended by the issuer and
accepted by the public as a medium of exchange to take the
place of money, they should be subjected to the same rules of
law applicable to money under like circumstances.34'
The court indicated a more realistic and less technical approach
would recognize that traveler's checks have been accepted by the public
as a medium of exchange and have acquired negotiable characteristics
by custom and general acceptance, not by statute.342
In Gray v. American Express Co. ,43 a North Carolina case, plain-
tiff received stolen traveler's checks from a customer. The plaintiff saw
the customer sign and countersign the checks, but they were not dated
and no payee was filled in.3 4 The court found for the defendant be-
cause the checks lacked the payee's name and thus were incomplete.345
According to Hawkland, cases involving traveler's checks have
been decided under one or more of three theories, each with its own
pitfall: (1) a traveler's check is simply a contract, obligating the issuer
to pay only where the countersignature matches (this overlooks its
highly negotiable character); (2) a traveler's check is money (this theory
overlooks the claimed advantage that traveler's checks are safer than
money, since the public has been educated to believe that loss of a trav-
eler's check does not carry the same consequences as loss of money);
(3) a traveler's check is a negotiable instrument (the real problem with
this theory is how to handle the forged countersignature).346
The basic appeal of traveler's checks is their world-wide accepta-
bility and quick refund when lost or stolen. This appeal has been en-
gendered not only by heavy advertising but also by the actual practice
by issuers of honoring traveler's checks containing forged countersigna-
tures if acquired in good faith and for value. The U.C.C. would allow
this custom to override its normal provisions governing commercial pa-
341. Id at 534. The court also pointed out that defendant was negligent in not seeing that the
purchaser signed the checks. Id at 536.
342. Id at 533. This case was decided before the adoption of the Code. The court indicated
that traveler's checks do not fall squarely within the ambit of the Negotiable Instruments Law or
the U.C.C.
343. Gray v. American Express Co., 34 N.C. App. 714, 239 S.E.2d 621 (1977).
344. Id, 239 S.E.2d at 622.
345. Id at 716, 239 S.E.2d at 623. The merchant himself could have completed the checks at
any time within nine years. U.C.C. § 3-115. He failed to do so and so "the instruments remained
incomplete and unenforceable as a matter of law." 34 N.C. App. at 716, 239 S.E.2d at 623.
346. Hawkland, supra note 312, at 409-10.
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per and would legally implement current practices.347 The U.C.C. rule
permitting custom to override general provisions does not require proof
that the practices involved be "ancient," "immemorial," or "universal."
It is enough that the usage involved be "currently observed by the great
majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut comers
do not agree." 348
VII. CONCLUSION
The public may think of any "bank check" as being the equivalent
of cash. By the use of the all-encompassing term "bank check," people
often confuse the terms "certified check," "cashier's check," "teller's
check," "money order," "bank money order," "register check," "trav-
eler's check," and other similar terms, mistakenly thinking of these var-
ious instruments as the same thing. By the use of any of these bank
checks, one can avoid carrying large sums of cash and the inherent risk
of its loss. Bank checks also allow payees to avoid the risk of insuffi-
cient funds, since after all, a bank is holding the money. However,
these various instruments do differ as to the customer's right to stop
payment, the bank's right to countermand payment, and in cash
equivalency.
A certified check provides great protection and comes the closest
among these instruments to being cash. As a general rule the drawer
may not stop payment on a certified check. Once a bank has certified a
check, the check is deemed accepted and the bank becomes primarily
liable.
Cashier's checks have been determined by most courts to be a
draft that is accepted when it is issued, since the drawer and drawee
banks are the same. Most courts hold that payment on a cashier's
check cannot be stopped or countermanded. Many of those courts
have expressly considered public policy, since the public views a cash-
ier's check as cash. However, several courts describe a cashier's check
as a note. This view is based on the Code provision that a draft drawn
on the drawee is effective as a note. The courts holding a cashier's
check to be a note have indicated that payment may be stopped if the
holder is not a holder in due course. The legal effect of a cashier's
check thus varies greatly according to whether it is viewed as a draft or
a note. It has been suggested that the Code be amended to resolve
347. Id at 411. See U.C.C. § 1-205 official comment 5 (1978) as to usage of trade.
348. U.C.C. § 1-205 official comment 5 (1978).
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some of the inherent problems in raising defenses to the payment of the
instrument.
A teller's check is a check issued by a savings bank (or savings and
loan association) and drawn upon a commercial bank. The drawer and
drawee are two different banks. Teller's checks have been interpreted
by most courts to be almost like a cashier's check in matters of cash
equivalency. However, teller's checks, unlike cashier's checks, are
sometimes issued by the savings bank as payment of the bank's own
obligations. If the bank later discovers a defense, the bank, like any
other drawer, would want to stop payment. Yet, if there is an absolute
prohibition against stopping payment the bank cannot assert its de-
fenses. One suggestion is that cashier's checks be deemed "cash
equivalents" and that teller's checks be issued subject to the issuing
bank's defenses.
A personal money order (or register check) is not equivalent to
cash at all. It is instead equivalent to a personal checking account. The
instrument is not signed by the bank and therefore the bank is not re-
sponsible to the payee or holder. The drawer of a personal check can
issue a stop payment order to the bank and the drawer of a personal
money order can do the same.
Traveler's checks are regarded as something of an anomaly and
their precise legal characteristics have not been fully determined. They
are regarded as a special category of negotiable instrument.
In order to decide the rights and liabilities of the parties to an in-
strument, it is necessary to observe carefully the physical characteristics
of the instrument itself. The Code provides no answer to most
problems, since these various instruments may not be referred to in the
Code. Suggested amendments to cover the various problems and ques-
tions clearly are necessary.
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